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Noëlie Frix 
NATO, RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE CRISIS 
This paper seeks to answer the theoretical question: Do international 
organizations (IOs) bring peace and stability to international relations? The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as a case study which can help answer this 
query. Initially, it is important to explore what realist and liberal scholars broadly argue 
on the matter of IOs, peace and stability. NATO as an organization is then examined, 
followed by the case study of the role it played in the Ukraine crisis. 
Many international organizations (IOs) exist today which deal with a wide variety 
of issues. The League of Nations, though it failed to fulfill its mandate of maintaining 
worldwide peace, can be considered the first modern international organization and 
served as the model for its successor, the United Nations. Realists—who argue that states 
are the principal actor in international relations (IR) and that they are self-interested and 
mainly concerned with security and power—look upon IOs skeptically. Liberals, though, 
believe in cooperation among states and promote the proliferation of international 
organizations, extolling their virtues. 
The heated debate between these two ideologies is evident in the case of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastward expansion. NATO was originally 
designed to curb the Soviet threat and protect Western Europe from communist 
expansion. When the Cold War ended and NATO’s original mandate had therefore 
expired, liberals championed the continued existence and expansion of the organization. 
Realists, on the other hand, warned of negative repercussions, as they foresaw that 
eastward expansion of the alliance would be perceived as a threat by Russia. 
v 
The 2014 Ukraine crisis provides a good case study which can help determine 
whether liberals or realists were right. Liberals have claimed that Russian aggression in 
the region justifies NATO expansion. Realists, however, have argued that it is the very 
fact of actual and prospective NATO expansion which has caused this aggression in the 
first place. 
Scott Pegg, Ph. D., Chair 
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Chapter I - Realists and Liberals on International Organizations 
Introduction 
Although globalization is a historical trend that is centuries old, the proliferation 
of international organizations (IOs) across the globe is rather recent. The horror wreaked 
upon the globe by the Second World War led to a strong and prevalent desire for peace 
among nations, which led, among other things, to the creation of the United Nations 
(UN), the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), European Union (EU), World Bank, and many other such organizations. The 
numerous international organizations today focus on matters as diverse as trade, human 
rights, defense, energy, health, aviation, agriculture and pretty much any topic one could 
think of. IOs have been at the center of heated debate between two major currents of 
thought in international relations: realism and liberalism. 
Realists argue that states, which are the principal actors in international relations, 
are self-interested and concerned mainly with power and security, as they operate in an 
anarchic world, which is to say there is no world government, no international ‘9-1-1’. 
They therefore advocate states use prudence and restraint. Liberals, on the other hand, 
have a generally more optimistic view of human nature, which they argue is 
fundamentally good. They believe that, through international cooperation, global 
progress, peace and stability are possible. While liberals have championed the 
proliferation of IOs, realists have been far more skeptical of the benefits they might bring 
about. 
This debate is significant in the realm of policymaking, as those Western leaders 
in power often follow liberal doctrine and support the proliferation and expansion of IOs. 
2 
The stabilizing function of these institutions should not be taken for granted, however. 
The case of NATO expansion can help indicate whether or not IOs bring peace, 
democratization and stability to world politics and inter-state relations. More specifically, 
the recent Ukraine crisis of 2014 is a telling case study of the risks expansion sometimes 
entails, which ought to encourage policymakers to think carefully before opting for 
liberal policies. 
A Brief History of International Organizations 
First and foremost, it is important to note there are several types of international 
organizations. Some, such as Doctors Without Borders, are nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), which can either be for profit or non-for-profit. This paper, 
however, concerns itself with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). According to José 
Alvarez these intergovernmental entities are “established by treaty, usually composed of 
permanent secretariats, plenary assemblies involving all member states, and executive 
organs with more limited participation” (Alvarez 2006, 324). The IGOs examined here 
are “a twentieth-century phenomenon having little in common with earlier forms of 
institutionalized cooperation” (Alvarez 2006, 324). The model for today’s international 
organizations can be found in the infamous post-World War I League of Nations. 
Although IOs like the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal Postal 
Union (1874) had been tried earlier, “The decisive move to institutionalize what 
heretofore had been only fitful attempts to codify discrete areas of international law, 
jointly administer the global commons (such as with respect to certain rivers and postal 
services), and peacefully settle interstate disputes, came, of course, in 1919, when the 
Covenant establishing the League of Nations was concluded” (Alvarez 2006, 324). The 
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League of Nations was “the world’s first multipurpose intergovernmental organization” 
and it engaged in “a wider definition of security that had emerged in state policy during 
and immediately after the First World War” (Clavin 2014, 265-66). During the First 
World War, certain “developments brought into being an incipient international 
bureaucracy that would be invoked by the League of Nations as part of efforts to 
safeguard a liberal, capitalist world order” (Clavin 2014, 266). Economics were even 
crucial to the formation of liberalism as an ideology that justified the creation of 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). The task, in the immediate aftermath of the 
Great War “was to moralise the liberal economy (and indeed international relations) by 
fostering, in the words of Jeanne Morefield, ‘a deeper appreciation among citizens of the 
spiritual bonds that connected them to the social whole’” (Wilson 2011, 894). From the 
very start, then, economic interdependency was deemed central to successful 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
The League of Nations’ efforts to confront the Austrian famine and economic 
crisis reflect the importance of also having common backgrounds, cultures, histories or 
governments for successful intergovernmental cooperation. Indeed, Western concerns 
regarding the Austrian hunger crisis were “not expressed primarily in terms of the risks to 
political stability or human health…Instead, the anxiety about the fate of Vienna felt in 
the West reflected a set of assumptions that gave this capital city a prominent place in 
western values” (Clavin 2014, 269). This demonstrates an important, and some might 
argue persistent, problem with international cooperation efforts: states are more willing to 
help those whom they associate with and view as akin to themselves. The League, 
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contrary to what its mandate would have required, was very ethnocentric and racist. The 
organization’s 
Intervention in Austria between 1919 and 1923 also reflected what were to 
become pronounced features of the approach of international organizations 
to intervention in the twentieth century. First, it demonstrated the 
importance of economic ideas and policy tools, as well as the power of 
economists and financiers, in shaping the work of international 
organizations…Second, the need for relief became associated with a 
malfunctioning national economy that could be restored to health by 
developing initiatives to support its productive capacity, its 
communication links and its financial stability (Clavin 2014, 278). 
 
In fact, economic concerns still guide many political moves and some international 
organizations are solely dedicated to economics and finance. This is not surprising, given 
the important place economics hold in international relations and could further be 
considered necessary. The occasional problem, however, is that some organizations 
sometimes end up putting profit ahead of people, or large economies ahead of poor ones. 
Part of the League’s shortcomings came from the absence of the United States. 
Nonetheless, “although the United States did not join the League, its capital and its ideas 
were as important as those of the institution’s predominant European powers in shaping 
the organization in its early years” (Clavin 2014, 278). American internationalists did try 
to “stay in touch with the League of Nations [and] to exploit the agency of the League of 
Nations” (Clavin 2014, 278). In the end, however, no matter their successes and efforts, 
the League was unable to prevent the rise of men like Mussolini and Hitler, allowing, in 
part through inaction, World War II to break out. Though a failure, as “the League of 
Nations’ founding claim which promised to make the world anew and to guarantee 
peace” did not achieve success (Clavin 2014, 265), the League was at least an attempt to 
secure peace, and it highlighted the desire for cooperation among nations. It also yielded 
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a bleak record of its weaknesses and mistakes. The League would serve as a template for 
the future of international organizations. 
Intergovernmental Organizations and Their Functions 
Most individuals have only a vague idea of what intergovernmental organizations 
are and of what they do. Yet they are critical actors in international relations. Satoshi 
Machida establishes the importance of IGOs, stating that international institutions 
have exerted a significant degree of influence on international political 
processes. Having implemented many programmes, the United Nations is 
one of the most important IGOs in the post-World War II era (Mingst and 
Karns 2007; Ziring et al. 2005). Similarly, the Bretton Woods 
institutions—the IMF and the World Bank—as well as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/[World Trade Organization] 
WTO, have contributed to creating a liberal economic order at the global 
level (Cohn 2008: 22–28; Cox 1986). The presence of these IGOs has 
been indispensable for creating international cooperation (Machida 2009, 
373). 
 
It is therefore important to establish how scholars define and conceptualize IGOs and 
related attributes. An IGO is “a formal, continuous structure established between 
[governmental] members from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the 
common interest of the membership” (Archer 2001: 33 quoted in Johnson 2011, 58). 
Intergovernmental “institutions can change a state’s calculations about how to maximize 
gains” through the rules they institutionalize, which “can increase the number of 
transactions between particular states over time,” lengthening the shadow of the future 
(Mearsheimer 1995, 18). These institutions can serve or fulfill several roles, including (1) 
enhancing cooperation by providing information—thereby reducing transaction costs and 
improving ease of monitoring—and facilitating reciprocity, both of which can serve 
states’ self-interests by either reducing costs, improving benefits, or both; (2) 
constraining great powers, which explains why less powerful, developing countries might 
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wish to join certain organizations, like the International Monetary Fund; (3) tying states 
together around different issues through issue-linkage, creating greater interdependence; 
(4) making commitments more credible; and (5) sometimes promoting domestic reforms 
(Keohane and Martin 1995, 42; Mearsheimer 1995, 18; Milner 2005, 838). These are not 
true of all international organizations and IGOs may only serve some, all, or none of 
these purposes, but at least one of these traits can generally be found in IGOs. 
International Regimes According to Krasner 
International regimes are an integral part of international relations, and in order to 
fully grasp the critiques of IOs, it is important to establish what these are as well. In 
Stephen D. Krasner’s words, “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983, 2). To 
take the global climate change regime as an example, the regime’s norms include cutting 
global greenhouse gas emissions, developing new ‘green’ technology, slowing 
deforestation, utilizing and improving drought-tolerant farming, and other such 
initiatives. The Kyoto Protocol is perhaps the most well-known global climate change 
regime, which is an internationally binding agreement that commits its signatories to 
reduce their carbon emissions. Krasner also specifies that “Regimes must be understood 
as something more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power or 
interests…Similarly, regime-governed behavior must not be based solely on short-term 
calculations of interest” (Krasner 1982, 2-3). Although some will argue that “the regime 
concept [is] useless, if not misleading” (Krasner 1982, 6), it can be argued the more 
important queries are: To what extent and how do regimes matter? “In a world of 
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sovereign states,” writes Krasner, “the basic function of regimes is to coordinate state 
behavior to achieve desired outcomes in particular issue-areas” (Krasner 1982, 7). There 
is no clear-cut answer whether or not they are successful in doing so. 
A More Detailed Look—What Constitutes a Formal IGO? 
Thomas J. Volgy, Elizabeth Fausett, Keith A. Grant and Stuart Rodgers, in 
“Identifying Formal Intergovernmental Organizations,” argue it is important to recognize 
formal intergovernmental organizations. These authors “develop a new database on 
IGOs, based on a definition focusing on three dimensions: formal organizations that 
demonstrate ongoing decisionmaking and oversight by states; evidence [of] bureaucratic 
organization; and demonstrate organizational autonomy” (Volgy, Fausett, Grand and 
Rodgers 2008, 837). Working under the assumption “that joining organizations is based 
both on opportunity and willingness,” the authors examine both the number of IGOs 
which states are qualified to join and how many they are a part of (Volgy et al. 2008, 
838). After examining existing definitions and empirical methods of distinguishing IGOs, 
the authors provide their own definition of “intergovernmental organizations as entities 
created with sufficient organizational structure and autonomy to provide formal, 
ongoing, multilateral processes of decision-making between states, along with the 
capacity to execute the collective will of their members” (Volgy et al. 2008, 839, italics in 
original). So how did they measure IGOs, how did they quantify their operationalized 
variables (decision-making and oversight, bureaucratic organization, autonomy)? 
Volgy et al. establish several thresholds for organizations to qualify as formal 
IGOs. First and foremost, they “concur that the threshold for membership is one that 
consists of an IGO that contains three or more member states,” second, they “require that 
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the membership be composed overwhelmingly of states and governed by them without a 
veto by nonstate members,” and their third threshold mandates that “state membership 
entail representation by individuals or groups acting on behalf of the state, as individuals 
who are either directly part of the central governmental machinery of a state, or are 
temporarily (albeit primarily) acting in that capacity” (Volgy et al. 2008, 840). 
Furthermore, the authors “require that collective decision-making and oversight be 
routinized: there are clear procedures governing the timing of meetings and decision-
making, and members meet routinely to make decisions and to exercise oversight over 
organizational operations;” though “Ideally, meetings would occur on an annual 
basis…[Volgy et al.] reluctantly accept the four year threshold for regular meetings, 
although most viable organizations appear to hold annual meetings of their members” 
(Volgy et al. 2008, 840-41). They then turn to the thresholds set for IGOs’ bureaucratic 
organization and autonomy. 
Volgy et al. note “the empirical correlates of collective decision-making, 
bureaucratic organization, and autonomy within an IGO may be difficult to separate” 
(Volgy et al. 2008, 841). For an IGO to be considered autonomous, “both staffing and 
funding [must] be relatively immune from control by either a single member state or 
outside forces [and] if the primary funding for administration is provided by another IGO 
or overwhelmingly by one state…then it fails to meet the autonomous resources 
threshold” (Volgy et al. 2008, 841). More specifically, “an IGO must demonstrate the 
existence of a permanent headquarters and nonsymbolic, professional staffing, 
independent of other IGOs and/or one single state [and] that a majority of the funding for 
the ongoing operations of the IGO be non-symbolic, systematically available, and 
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independent of any one state or another IGO” (Volgy et al. 2008, 841-42). After 
establishing their measures and variables, the authors constructed their database. 
The Formal IGOs database has data for three different points in time, 1975, 1989, 
and 2004. According to Volgy et al. their “database yields 265 IGOs that are alive in 
2004…the number of [Formal] IGOs created during the 1970s alone accounts for 
approximately one-quarter of all [Formal] IGOs still alive in 2004, a number larger than 
all the [Formal] IGOs created since the end of the Cold War” (Volgy et al. 2008, 844-45). 
The prevalence of IGOs seems to indicate their importance. The timing of the creation of 
the majority of these organizations demonstrates faith in intergovernmental organizations 
and their ability to maintain peace and stability in the world. 
Support and Legitimacy of IGOs 
Support for international organizations is not uniform across the world—far from 
it. In “Globalization and the Legitimacy of Intergovernmental Organizations,” Machida 
explores how democracy and inequality across the globe affect the legitimacy of IGOs 
and the support for globalization across states. Throughout the years, there have been 
protests against the proliferation of IGOs. IGOs’ lack of democratic accountability, 
referred to as the ‘democratic deficit’ issue, is one of the most notable and contentious 
problems (Machida 2009, 371). To have support, IGOs require a fair degree of 
legitimacy, which can affect “the effectiveness of IGOs in globalization processes” 
(Machida 2009, 373) and which some institutions do not seem to possess in sufficient 
amounts, at least according to their opponents. According to Suchman, the concept of 
legitimacy entails “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman 1995: 574 quoted in Johnson 2011, 58). 
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Legitimacy can also refer to “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution 
ought to be obeyed” (Hurd 1999 quoted in Machida 2009, 373). In sum, “if citizens 
perceive that IGOs effectively deliver benefits in an appropriate manner, they tend to 
demonstrate greater support for IGOs” (Machida 2009, 374). Trust by not only great 
powers themselves, but their citizens as well, is therefore of the utmost importance as it 
relates to IGOs’ effectiveness. If great powers do not trust that IGOs can achieve what 
they set out to, it is unlikely they will invest the time and resources into them. Likewise, 
if citizens of participating states do not trust that IGOs work for their benefit, they are 
unlikely to support that organization, perhaps pressuring their governments to leave or 
scale back participation in said-organization. 
It is not easy for IGOs to garner legitimacy, especially in a world with no 
international government, where some argue individual states’ selfish aims are likely to 
be deemed more important than international cooperation. Part of the difficulty in being 
regarded as legitimate comes from the issue of democratic deficit. Machida writes, 
Gabel (1998: 7–8) defines democratic deficit as: ‘the reduced public 
participation in and control over policy that resulted from moving political 
authority from the national to the supranational level.’…As IGOs gain 
more power in the global arena to cope with various issues, citizens tend 
to feel alienated from the decision-making processes involving IGOs 
(Machida 2009, 374). 
 
This means that as IGOs gain authority, the impression among citizens that they have less 
opportunity to influence policy and to participate in their government can alienate them 
from these international institutions and inhibit the latter’s perceived legitimacy. 
According to Bhavna Thakur “attaining a democratic structure which would involve 
various actors who will represent the interests and wants of the local communities at the 
global level” could help improve legitimacy (Thakur 2010, 207). Although they might be 
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intended to provide stability, humanitarian aid or health care services, or to try 
maintaining peace, some IGOs may lack legitimacy and effectiveness because of the 
democratic deficit. 
States with different levels of democracy perceive IGOs differently. Machida 
finds that while “economic and socio-technical dimensions of globalization erode the 
legitimacy of IGOs in weak democratic states, that effect is absent in strong democracies” 
(Machida 2009, 390). He argues that, because “the nature of a democratic political 
system…allows citizens to effectively delegate authority to a higher authority,” and since 
“the openness of a democratic political system provides citizens with various kinds of 
opportunities to influence the decision-making processes of IGOs…citizens in 
democratic states do not associate globalization with negative perceptions of IGOs” 
(Machida 2009, 390). 
Democratic deficit is not the only factor which stands in the way of legitimacy. 
Tana Johnson also studies “threats to IGO legitimacy” (Johnson 2011, 57). Johnson, like 
many authors, starts by emphasizing the prevalence of IGOs and how they pervade world 
politics. She writes, “Even the world’s most powerful states work through 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)” (Johnson 2011, 58). Since IGOs do not have 
militaries to rely upon, “to elicit compliance and enforcement, they [instead] cultivate 
perceptions of legitimacy and impel others through moral suasion” (Johnson 2011, 58). 
Although IGOs try to “distinguish themselves from individual self-serving member-
states, instead professing their impartial pursuit of the greater good for their collective 
membership… states [do] exert institutionalized and/or ideational influence within IGOs” 
(Johnson 2011, 58). Where legitimacy is concerned, she argues that “unfavorable views 
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toward a particular state will result in skepticism about the legitimacy of IGOs in which 
that state possesses influence” (Johnson 2011, 58). 
There is no denying the importance and impact of IGOs on the world has been 
and continues to be significant. However, the extent of that influence and whether it has 
had positive outcomes and is desirable is up to debate. 
Realism and the Limits of Cooperation 
Generally speaking, realists across the board hold some common assumptions 
about international organizations. Notably, states are selfish and will act in their own 
interests. In Krasner’s words, “outcomes related to either regimes or behavior ultimately 
remain a function of the distribution of power among states” (Krasner 1982, 356-57). 
According to Robert O. Keohane, “A simple explanation for the failure of a given attempt 
at cooperation in world politics is always available: that the interests of the states 
involved were incompatible with one another” (Keohane 1984, 65). Realists argue states 
do cooperate based on shared interests, but they do so only to the extent they can benefit 
from cooperation. There is no certainty that states which successfully cooperate today 
will continue to do so tomorrow, if their situations were to change. Indeed, IGOs are 
institutions, which Mearsheimer defines as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which 
states should cooperate and compete with each other,” and one significant shortcoming of 
IGOs, in the realist view, is that “although rules are usually incorporated into a formal 
international organization, it is not the organization per se that compels states to obey the 
rules. Institutions are not a form of world government. States themselves must choose to 
obey the rules they created” (Mearsheimer 1995, 8-9). 
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Even though discord is prevalent and, according to realism, the norm in 
international relations, “If the egoists monitor each other’s behavior and if enough of 
them are willing to cooperate on condition that others cooperate as well, they may be able 
to adjust their behavior to reduce discord. They may even create and maintain principles, 
norms, rules, and procedures,” in other words, regimes (Keohane 1984, 84). Realists 
therefore account for the continued existence of IGOs and international regimes by 
contending that “Properly designed institutions can help egoists to cooperate even in the 
absence of a hegemonic power” (Keohane 1984, 84). 
Susan Strange criticizes regime analysis and international organizations on five 
counts. First and foremost, she sets forth her concern that the concept of regimes “may be 
a passing fad,” of a particularly American nature (Strange 1982, 338). She proposes the 
“fashion for regimes” arose from the “somewhat subjective perceptions in many 
American minds” that American power was on the decline, which “liberal, 
internationalist academics” reacted to by asking “how the damage could be minimized by 
restoring or repairing or reforming the mechanisms of multilateral management—
‘regimes’” (Strange 1982, 339). Although in the 1970s the balance of power between the 
two superpowers, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., was still very much in place, the power of the 
U.S. was, and is, in no way, shape, or form infallible. Reality does not show nearly as 
dramatic a decline as some Americans perceived. In fact, “Where decline exists, it is a 
falling-off in the country’s power and will to intervene with world market 
mechanisms…rather than significant change in the distribution of military or economic 
power to the favor of other states” (Strange 1982, 341). 
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Strange also examines the “perception on the part of Americans…that there is 
some mystery about the rather uneven performance in recent times of many international 
arrangements and organizations…The mixed record of international organizations,” the 
author insists, “really does not need explaining” (Strange 1982, 341). She believes 
Americans struggle to “distinguish between the three somewhat different purposes served 
by international organizations” (Strange 1982, 342). She identifies these as strategic, 
adoptive and symbolic. IGOs used to incorporate and balance all three functions. In 
recent times, however, an imbalance has seemingly arisen, in part because “where once 
the United States was able to dominate organizations like the United Nations, it can no 
longer do so because of the inflation of membership and the increasing divergence 
between rich and poor over fundamentals” (Strange 1982, 342). Strange sounds a bit 
sarcastic as she describes the symbolic functions of IGOs, which she claims allows 
everybody to declare themselves in favor of truth, beauty, goodness, and 
world community, while leaving governments free to pursue national self-
interests and to do exactly as they wish…many organizations [express] 
and partially [satisfy] the universal yearning for a ‘better world’ without 
doing anything substantial to bring it about…the tendency toward 
symbolism, expressed in a proliferation of Declarations, Charters, Codes 
of Conduct, and other rather empty texts, has strengthened as the ability to 
reach agreement on positive action to solve real global problems has 
weakened (Strange 1982, 342). 
 
This realist critique, though harsh, holds some unfortunate truth to it. Take the case of the 
United Nations, for instance. It did not authorize the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, however 
the country still went ahead, ignoring the UN and international community’s wishes. This 
undermines the (some would argue already weak or inexistent) authority of IGOs, 
especially since the U.S. suffered no real consequences.1 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
                                                          
1 Except unwarranted loss of lives, time and resources. 
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“prohibits states’ unilateral recourse to force except (per Article 51) in response to an 
armed attack,” but “noncompliance with that law is undermining respect for it, and for 
international law in general” (Franck 2006, 93). Therein is born the legitimate fear that 
“what NATO did with respect to Kosovo and what the U.S.-led states did in invading 
Iraq have generated a wide-spread perception that violations of the international law 
restraining states from recourse to force have dissolved the rule’s element of 
determinacy, so that it no longer actually ‘binds’ states” (Franck 2006, 93-94). Perhaps 
this represents the greatest challenge to IGOs yet, as “a rule that is riddled with 
exceptions no longer makes a clear statement and cannot be taken as a serious predictor 
of state conduct. As such, it invites further violations of that and other rules. Or it 
generates momentum for a different norm, one that accommodates the violations and 
makes them the basis of a new rule” (Franck 2006, 94). Certainly this reinforces realist 
claims that IGOs have little to no true power and are instead at the mercy of great 
powers’ actions and decisions. 
Susan Strange then proceeds to her second issue, the imprecision associated with 
the term ‘regime.’ Such “wooly words” lend themselves to confusion. The word regime, 
even within Krasner’s International Regimes is “used to mean different things” which is 
more than just slightly problematic in her eyes; if “there is no fundamental consensus 
about the answer to Krasner’s first questions, ‘What is a regime?’, obviously there is not 
going to be much useful or substantial convergence of conclusions about the answer to 
other questions concerning their making and unmaking” (Strange 1982, 343). Not only is 
it wooly, but the term regime is also value-loaded, the third problem Strange warns 
against. By this she means “it implies certain things that ought not to be taken for 
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granted” (Strange 1982, 344). As the author points out, regime is a French word with two 
main meanings. 
First and most commonly, it is used to mean a diet. Its second meaning, which is 
the one familiar to English-speakers, is political and often has a negative connotation:  
the government of a society by an individual, a dynasty, party or group 
that wields effective power over the rest of society…The word is more 
often used of forms of government that are inherently authoritarian, 
capricious, and even unjust…In short, government, rulership, and 
authority are the essence of the word, not consensus, nor justice, nor 
efficiency in administration (Strange 1982, 344). 
 
There is something misguiding about the term, then. There is no world government, no 
single international regime, in that sense of the term. Indeed, “Above all, a single, 
recognized locus of power over time is the one attribute that the international system so 
conspicuously lacks. Anytime the slightest hint of any” world army, world court, world 
central bank, or world tax system “is breathed in diplomatic circles, state governments 
have all their defenses at the ready to reject even the most modest encroachment on what 
they regard as their national prerogatives” (Strange 1982, 345). This represents a good 
instance of the erroneous value-loaded side of the term, since the “analogy with national 
governments implied by the use of the word regime…is inherently false” (Strange 1982, 
345).  
Her fourth point of contention lies in the notion, in part stemming from the nature 
of the word, that a regime has a “static quality of arrangements for managing the 
international system and introducing some confidence in the future of anarchy, some 
order out of uncertainty” (Strange 1982, 346). But international relations are not static. 
During the Cold War, “security matters were not predictable or stable” (Strange 1982, 
347). And despite the Bretton Woods system, economic and monetary matters were also 
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subject to instability and change, often guided by national interests. To Strange, “The 
changeable nature of all these international arrangements behind the blank institutional 
façade” means “The search for common factors and for general rules (or even axioms), 
which is of the essence of regime analysis, is therefore bound to be long, exhausting, and 
probably disappointing” (Strange 1982, 348). The assumption that regimes are fairly 
stable and static is simply unwarranted, says Strange. 
Her last warning deals with state-centeredness. Regime analysis narrows 
international relations studies’ focus. By this Strange means that “attention to these 
regime questions leaves the study of international political economy far too constrained 
by the self-imposed limits of the state-centered paradigm” (Strange 1982, 349). The 
issues which governments must address domestically and which they care most about are 
not necessarily those they deal with in international organizations, and these matters are 
often not those the public regards as important either. As such, “Attention to 
regimes…accords to governments far too much of the right to define the agenda of 
academic study and directs the attention of scholars mainly to those issues that 
government officials find significant and important,” potentially leading academics to 
“abdicate responsibility for the one task [of developing] a philosophy of international 
relations or international political economy that will not only explain and illuminate but 
will point a road ahead and inspire action to follow it. Thus,” she concludes, “regime 
analysis risks overvaluing the positive and undervaluing the negative aspects of 
international cooperation” (Strange 1982, 349). Regime analysis leads scholars to ignore 
important aspects of international relations. 
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Perhaps the most crucial point Strange makes is that great powers act through 
regimes and are the actual source of power themselves, not the regimes they operate 
through. Hence regimes have no stand-alone power and are merely tools at the service of 
great powers. Without great power backers, international regimes or institutions are 
impotent. For instance, unless the 5 permanent members of the Security Council agree on 
something, the UN is powerless. Only when they do agree can the UN act; when they fail 
to do so, it is foolish to blame the UN, given it is great powers who are unwilling to 
cooperate, not the IGO itself. 
Mearsheimer is one of the most well-known realists in the field of international 
relations. According to him, “states cannot depend on others for their own security,” and 
survival is a state’s ultimate goal, which is best served by selfishness (Mearsheimer 2014, 
33). Although “self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances,” these “are only 
temporary marriages of convenience” (Mearsheimer 2014, 33). Obviously, with a 
mentality such as this, Mearsheimer is bound to be skeptical of international 
organizations. He writes, the “claim is sometimes made that great powers can transcend 
realist logic by working together to build an international order that fosters peace and 
justice,” but that is mostly rubbish, because “great powers do not,” in fact, “work together 
to promote world order for its own sake,” even though they do “work hard to deter wars 
in which they would be the likely victim” (Mearsheimer 2014, 48-49). He sets forth two 
main reasons why “Great powers cannot commit themselves to the pursuit of a peaceful 
world order…First, states are unlikely to agree on a general formula for bolstering 
peace,” and second, since states can never be certain of others’ intentions, “great powers 
cannot put aside power considerations and work to promote international peace, because 
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they cannot be sure that their efforts will succeed,” and hence, “prudence dictates that 
they behave according to realist logic” (Mearsheimer 2014, 50-51). Mearsheimer allows 
for the possibility of cooperation, he is simply, as all realists are, dubious as to how 
successful it can be. 
Cooperation between states is “sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult 
to sustain,” mainly due to “considerations about relative gains and concern about 
cheating” (Mearsheimer 2014, 51-52). This means that “States contemplating cooperation 
must consider how the profits or gains will be distributed among them,” thinking in terms 
of relative gains 
means each side not only considers its individual gain, but also how well it 
does compared to the other side. Because states in a realist world are 
concerned about the balance of power, they must be motivated primarily by 
relative gains concerns when considering cooperation. While each state 
wants to maximize its absolute gains, it is more important to make sure that 
it does better, or at least no worse, than the other state in any agreement 
(Mearsheimer 1995, 12). 
 
And although “great powers do cooperate in a realist world…cooperation takes place in a 
world that is competitive at its core,” ergo, “No amount of cooperation can eliminate the 
dominating logic of security competition” (Mearsheimer 2014, 52-53). He writes, “Since 
the Cold War ended, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements 
in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international 
institutions” (Mearsheimer 1995, 5). But as opposed to institutionalists, realists do not 
believe IGOs “markedly affect the prospects for international stability” (Mearsheimer 
1995, 7). He summarizes the realist mentality in just a few words, “Realists maintain that 
institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are 
based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no 
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independent effect on state behavior. Realists therefore believe that institutions are not an 
important cause of peace” (Mearsheimer 1995, 7). 
Grieco states that, “For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and 
conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share 
common interests…international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s 
constraining effects on inter-state cooperation” (Grieco 1988, 485). Mearsheimer’s 
research, which in his article “The False Promise of International Institutions” focuses on 
critiquing leading institutionalist theories, corroborates Grieco’s claim, leading him to 
conclude that “institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little 
promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world” (Mearsheimer 1995, 7). One 
of the main issues, according to Grieco, is that of relative gains versus absolute gains. 
While liberals seem to suppose states care only about absolute gains, Grieco argues this is 
a faulty assumption. He instead believes “a state will decline to join, will leave, or will 
sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are 
achieving, or are likely to achieve, relatively greater gains;” in other words, although a 
state could come away from a cooperative arrangement with absolute gains, if its relative 
gains are minimal or negative, it “will eschew cooperation” (Grieco 1988, 499). 
‘Do not place too much faith and trust in international organizations and regimes’ 
could be the one-sentence message to take away from realists. Indeed, Susan Strange 
provides an eerie warning which resonates historically, “Let us never forget the folly of 
League of Nations reformers, busily drafting new blueprints while Hitler and Mussolini 
lit fires under the whole system” (Strange 1982, 346). In classic pessimistic realist tones, 
Mearsheimer similarly concludes that “The failure of the League of Nations to address 
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German and Japanese aggression in the 1930s is a case in point” of the “damage that false 
faith in institutional theories can cause…The failure of institutions to prevent or stop the 
war in Bosnia offers a more recent example” (Mearsheimer 1995, 49). Notably, “These 
cases illustrate that institutions have mattered rather little in the past; they also suggest 
that the false belief that institutions matter has mattered more, and has had pernicious 
effects. Unfortunately, misplaced reliance on institutional solutions is likely to lead to 
more failures in the future” (Mearsheimer 1995, 49). 
Liberalism and Support for IGOs 
Liberals have a very different, much more optimistic view of humankind and 
international relations. Politics according to liberals is not a zero-sum game, indeed, 
“Mutual cooperation on issues ranging from international trade to nuclear 
nonproliferation to disease prevention can yield global public goods on a massive 
scale…Major actors in world politics therefore have an incentive to realize the benefits 
that come from long-term mutual cooperation and avoid the costs that come with mutual 
defection” (Drezner 2011, 47). This, of course, does not mean actors always choose 
cooperation, even if it is beneficial to everyone. There are a number of strategies and 
conditions, such as those which lengthen the shadow of the future and economic 
interdependence, which the liberal paradigm suggests make cooperation more likely and 
longer-lasting. 
Democratic peace theory is a major tenet of liberalism. This posits that 
democracies do not go to war with one another and are more likely to cooperate with 
each other. This is fundamentally different from the realist idea that a country’s form of 
government has only a limited effect on policy, or to put it more bluntly, that states’ 
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internal characteristics do not matter. Additionally, democracies’ “domestic laws and 
institutions [provide them] with the means to credibly commit to international 
agreements” (Drezner 2011, 49). Evidently, liberals are quite fond of IGOs. Indeed, 
Liberals are responsible for the very creation of international organizations. Their belief 
in and desire for cooperation among states worldwide led to the successful establishment 
of numerous IGOs. As aforementioned, economics plays a major role in liberalism, 
which is “deeply enmeshed with neoclassical economics” (Haas 1982, 49). International 
relations, according to the liberal paradigm, should be “based on a division of labor that 
efficiently maximizes the welfare of all,” and it should ensure international life is “stable 
and give[s] satisfaction to those who might lose out in a pure liberal order…liberals wish 
to fashion ‘strong’ regimes, which maximize efficiency, stability, and the hierarchy 
appropriate to the issue to be regulated” (Haas 1982, 49). Liberals believe that, even 
though “anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can 
work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions” 
(Grieco 1988, 486). Liberal proponents of international institutions, as optimistic as they 
might be, are not blinded either. These “liberal institutionalists treat states as rational 
egoists operating in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced, 
and…institutionalists only expect interstate cooperation to occur if states have significant 
common interest” (Keohane and Martin 1995, 39). IGOs have been and continue to be 
successful, in many liberals’ eyes, and they remain relevant, especially as an instrument 
for peace, freedom and prosperity. 
Stephen D. Krasner argues regime analysis shares “the fundamental assumptions 
of a realist structural paradigm: an international system composed of egoistic sovereign 
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states differentiated only by their power capabilities” (Krasner 1982, 355). He points out 
that perhaps regimes deserve more credit than realists give them. Regime analysis may 
not be just a passing fad. For example, a “change in power distribution,” which realists 
view as of the utmost importance in international relations and in the decisions that are 
made in international organizations, “does not always imply a change in outcomes 
because regimes may function as intervening variables” (Krasner 1982, 357). If regimes 
do “assume a life of their own, a life independent of the basic causal factors that led to 
their creation in the first place,” then one must allow for the possibility that these regimes 
are important, and do have some independent impact on international relations (Krasner 
1982, 357). “Ultimately,” he writes, although “state power and interests condition both 
regime structures and related behavior…there may be a wide area of leeway,” 
considering that “Principles, norms, rules, and procedures may not conform with the 
preferences of the most powerful states” (Krasner 1982, 357).2 He also notes the 
historical formation of international regimes is important to their study and scholars’ 
understandings of IGOs. 
Krasner points out the importance of time in international regimes. The latter’s 
“creation usually occurs at times of fundamental discontinuity in the international system, 
such as the conclusions of major wars” (Krasner 1982, 357). Indeed, the aim of liberals 
who promoted the creation and propagation of IGOs, the “goal of the [so-called] 
perpetual peace project was to bring reason to bear on the problem of war, in order to 
construct a World order that would progress towards an elimination of war” (Ashworth 
1995, 109). In the aftermath of wars and, as such, “When regimes are first created[,] there 
                                                          
2 Again the 2003 Iraq war seems like such an instance. 
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is a high degree of congruity between power distributions and regime characteristics: 
powerful states establish regimes that enhance their interests. But over time the two can 
drift apart” (Krasner 1982, 357). “In general,” Krasner continues, “the basic principles 
and norms of regimes are very durable and, once a regime is created, adjustment is likely 
to involve altering rules and decision-making procedures…Once regimes are established, 
they assume a life of their own” (Krasner 1982, 357-58). The United Nations has been 
around since 1945 and still plays a significant role in world politics. It has experienced 
change over time. Whether or not one agrees with its policies, or whether it does too 
much or not enough, the United Nations indisputably does have some impact on the 
world stage, and if it has lasted seventy years, despite its issues and lack of power, one 
can hope this means the UN is doing something beneficial on the world stage. It is 
legitimate to claim that, in some form or fashion, international regimes and organizations 
do matter. To once again take the global climate change regime as an example, although 
the Kyoto Protocol failed to meet its stated goals, it was successful in reducing certain 
countries’ carbon emissions. There have been some notable failures, such as China, but 
overall there are more successes, as the sum of CO2 emissions from Kyoto signatory 
nations has declined. 
Robert O. Keohane writes that, even though imperfect, there are mechanisms in 
place which promote compliance by member states with international regimes. He states, 
“International regimes are decentralized institutions. Decentralization,” however, “does 
not imply an absence of mechanisms for compliance,” Keohane notes, “but it does mean 
that any sanctions for violation of regime principles or rules have to be enacted by the 
individual members” (Keohane 1984, 98). He admits “Decentralized enforcement of 
25 
regime rules and principles is neither swift nor certain. Yet, in many instances, rules are 
obeyed” (Keohane 1984, 98). Sometimes, governments even comply with international 
rules when it is not in that state’s self-interest. According to Franck, this is in part 
explained by the principle that, “In any society, but especially among states, the 
compliance pull of law is based on the expectation of each participant that most others, 
most of the time, will obey the law—all of it, not just some subsets, and not only when it 
is in their immediate interest to do so. That law has an inherent capacity to generate 
compliance is…as fundamental to the state system as it is ephemeral” (Franck 2006, 90-
91). It is 
faith in law’s ability to predict state behavior [that] is the key to its ability 
to pull nations toward voluntary compliance…The real power of law to 
secure systematic compliance does not rest, primarily, on police 
enforcement…but, rather, on the general belief of those to whom the law 
is addressed that they have a stake in the rule of law itself: that law is 
binding because it is the law. That, of course, is a fragile psychological 
belief (Franck 2006, 91). 
 
And while this belief is fragile and its wavering can lead to chaos, there is nonetheless a 
prevailing trend of compliance, even when the law does not necessarily benefit a state. 
This apparent deviation from egoism offers some evidence that realists’ pessimism might 
be at least slightly exaggerated. Realists assume that governments are purely and entirely 
egoist, but “Governments are composed of individuals, some of whom have values that 
extend beyond their own narrowly conceived self-interest,” there is even a possibility 
“that empathy could have profound effects on the prospects for international cooperation” 
(Keohane 1984, 108-109). 
Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin refute many of Mearsheimer’s claims in 
their article, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” Mearsheimer often demands proof 
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that IGOs matter, and Keohane and Martin are more than happy to oblige, pointing out 
major governments’ significant investments in “material and reputational resources in 
NATO, the EU, and also in organizations such as the [WTO] and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)” (Keohane and Martin 1995, 40). Mearsheimer asserts 
policymakers, particularly idealistic American ones, are deluded. But Keohane and 
Martin retaliate by asking if, “In light of states’ investments in international institutions, 
it is fair to turn Mearsheimer’s question around: could we not legitimately demand 
evidence either that leaders of governments are deluded or that NATO and the EU are 
designed to deceive unsophisticated observers” (Keohane and Martin 1995, 41)? 
Fundamentally, they pose the question, if institutions were really useless and worthless, 
then would state leaders really invest so much time, effort and resources into creating and 
maintaining them? 
Mearsheimer also tends to exaggerate how much faith liberals have in institutions. 
Institutionalists do recognize the limits of IGOs, “institutions make a significant 
difference in conjunction with power realities,” they are subject to power plays (Keohane 
and Martin 1995, 42). The authors also object to the criticism that institutionalists dismiss 
relative gains issues; “Two issues are more significant: (1) the conditions under which 
relative gains are important; and (2) the role of institutions when distributional issues are 
significant—that is, when relative gains are at stake” (Keohane and Martin 1995, 44). 
The main point to take away from institutionalists on the issue is that the importance of 
relative gains “is conditional on factors such as the number of major actors in the system 
and whether military advantage favors offense or defense;” furthermore, “distributional 
conflict may render institutions more important” (Keohane and Martin 1995, 44). One 
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way this can be the case is when many states are involved in a cooperative arrangement 
on which they might disagree, for in such complex situations, “international institutions 
can step in to provide ‘constructed focal points’ that make particular cooperative 
outcomes prominent…just as institutions can mitigate fears of cheating and so allow 
cooperation to emerge, so can they alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation” 
(Keohane and Martin 1995, 45). In fact, some “studies show that institutions…change the 
incentives for states to cheat; they also reduce transaction costs, link issues, and provide 
focal points for cooperation” (Keohane and Martin 1995, 49). Although they are far from 
perfect, “in a world politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and 
unlikely to experience effective hierarchical governance, international institutions 
operating on the basis of reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace” (Keohane 
and Martin 1995, 50). 
Assessing IGOs 
Helen V. Milner concentrates on three economically-focused international 
organizations to demonstrate their flaws as well as the positive effects these have had. 
These institutions are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (now called the World Bank), and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was expanded and institutionalized into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). “Conventional wisdom,” she explains, “has held 
that international institutions…have been largely beneficial for the countries in them” 
because they are believed to “constrain the behavior of the most powerful countries and 
provide information and monitoring capacities that enable states to cooperate” (Milner 
2005, 833-34). That claim has been challenged by anti-globalization activists, leading 
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Milner to combine normative and empirical studies in search of an answer. The three 
economic institutions she examines are in need of reform, Milner concludes, but they 
should not be abolished. 
As previously noted, international institutions are not static and do evolve over 
time. The same is true of the IMF, World Bank and WTO, whose roles have changed and 
whose “membership has become nearly universal” (Milner 2005, 836). As with many 
current IOs, these economic institutions were created by the victorious powers following 
World War II. They were designed to maintain a stable economy and to “help the 
developed countries create a cooperative and stable world economy in a nonglobalized 
world” (Milner 2005, 836). This is not the world they operate in today. From a total 
membership hovering in the twenties upon their conception, these organizations now 
accommodate 150 countries or more. Criticism pointed at the lack of progress in 
developing countries may in part be due to the fact that, “Except for the World Bank, the 
original and primary mission of these institutions was not promoting growth in the 
developing world,” but “since the change in their roles from the 1970s onward, they have 
[nevertheless] increasingly been judged by their impact on the poor” (Milner 2005, 836). 
Milner finds that these institutions are in need of reform, but are likely to have 
been more beneficial than harmful. The “record of economic outcomes” in developing 
countries “has raised questions about the impact of these international economic 
institutions” (Milner 2005, 837). Whether or not these countries would have been better 
off without these organizations’ support, however, is a counterfactual question which 
cannot be definitely answered. But since states are rational actors, “The rush lately by all 
countries to join these institutions suggests that developing countries have found them to 
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be more beneficial than the alternative of staying out” (Milner 2005, 838). Even so, these 
institutions have not had as beneficial an effect as expected of them. 
Milner lays out some of the challenges associated with the World Bank, IMF and 
WTO. These IGOs “have had a difficult time constraining the large, developed countries 
[which] have [often] bargained hard to maximize their advantage vis-à-vis the developing 
nations” (Milner 2005, 848). These institutions might have helped these developing 
nations by providing easier or better “access to trade, aid, and loans,” however they could 
have done so without bargaining so hard at little cost to their political capital, thus 
providing “more benefits for the poor” (Milner 2005, 848). There is also the problem of 
asymmetry. For instance, although these IGOs have helped “provide monitoring and 
information…it is the developing countries that are monitored and provide more 
information than otherwise” (Milner 2005, 848). Furthermore, “For these three 
organizations, reciprocity vis-à-vis the developing world has not been a central mission; 
trade agreements have often been very asymmetric and the aid and lending programs are 
one way;” and while their impact on developing countries’ “domestic situation has been 
powerful,” it has “not always [been] benign” (Milner 2005, 848). 
The WTO, IMF and World Bank have not been nearly as beneficial for 
developing countries as many would have hoped. One possible explanation is that 
“globalization has simply overwhelmed these institutions and that their impact is minor 
compared to other factors,” (Milner 2005, 848). It is also possible their problems “lie in 
the pressures exerted by the large, developed countries and private producers and 
investors. Both of these groups have shaped the functioning of the WTO, IMF, and 
World Bank,” and they often strive to serve their own interests, sometimes at the expense 
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of poorer countries; “Finally,” Milner notes, “one cannot overlook the claim that part of 
the problem arises from the internal organization and procedures of the institutions 
themselves” (Milner 2005, 848). Still, it remains important to give due credit to these 
IGOs for their accomplishments, namely in giving the developing world access to 
markets which could otherwise have been unattainable, and for providing economic aid 
to them—though perhaps not as generously as they could have. 
While reform may be overdue, it is not time to abolish these institutions, which 
have helped, in some—perhaps limited—capacity, developing nations. Milner states, 
“even though problems abound with the institutions, one cannot rule out the 
counterfactual: without these institutions many developing countries could be worse off 
as they faced bilateral negotiations with the most powerful countries” (Milner 2005, 848). 
Though the WTO, World Bank and IMF are plagued with issues, it is important to move 
forward. To do so, “these institutions could be reformed at low cost to the wealthy 
countries to provide more benefits to the poor” (Milner 2005, 849). More research ought 
to be conducted: “Identifying who gains and who loses from existing policies is 
important both to determine the need for policy change and to build support for such 
change” (Milner 2005, 849). Despite their flaws, therefore, it is imperative that these 
institutions are not dismissed but rather allowed to reform and change in order to better 
fulfill their mandates. 
Conclusion 
Neither liberalism nor realism is wholly true or the definitive gospel of 
international relations, however, parts of both theories are applicable to different aspects 
and situations that arise in IR. There is undeniable value to be found in international 
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organizations, just as there are inevitable shortcomings attached. IGOs have impacted the 
world, sometimes in beneficial ways, other times not. States often are self-interested, it is 
true, but many individuals are capable of empathy and this is sometimes reflected in the 
realm of international relations. Whether, as realists claim, cooperation only works—and 
barely so—to the extent that states stand to benefit from it, or whether it stems from a 
common desire for peace and the desire to promote freedom and rights across the world, 
international organizations and regimes do and will continue to exist. 
Some IGOs, such as the World Health Organization, give credence to liberal 
claims that they provide benefits worldwide and have a generally positive impact on the 
global population. However, liberal idealism can also become harmful at times. The case 
of NATO illustrates the necessity to be cautious and take heed of realist warnings. The 
expansion of the organization has led to violent conflict in Eastern Europe—Georgia and 
Ukraine—and heightened tensions between Russia and the West.  
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Chapter II - NATO and Russia: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly 
Introduction 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was originally designed to curb 
the Soviet threat and protect Western Europe from Communist expansionism. In Zoltan 
Barany‘s words, “The collapse of the Soviet Union effectively cancelled the raison d’être 
of the Atlantic Alliance” (Barany 2006, 165). Having “managed to adapt itself to a 
radically different world,” NATO not only survived the end of the Cold War, but grew in 
scope, power and membership (Barany 2006, 166). Some scholars, generally of the 
liberal persuasion, have viewed this as a positive sign, one of the West’s triumphs and a 
vibrant sign of transnational solidarity. Others of the realist school of thought, though, 
believe the Organization’s expansionism is dangerous and threatening—they argue 
NATO is a source of tensions between East and West, particularly where Russia is 
concerned. Starting in 1994, during what Victor Israelyan calls the cold peace, two issues 
“caused the greatest tension and have the most potential to continue,” as they have, “to 
upset U.S.-Russian relations—the expansion of [NATO] and the recognition of Russia’s 
special interest in the countries of the former Soviet Union” (Israelyan 1998, 51-52). The 
questions which scholars still pose today include whether or not NATO should have 
ceased existing, should it pursue expansion, and what ought to happen to the 
Organization today? Examining Russia’s interests in the former Soviet bloc, and its 
reactions to NATO’s expansionist policies and actions in Eastern Europe can help 
indicate which of these two views might be more accurate, or at least, more relevant in 
today’s political context. 
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NATO’s Mandate 
NATO was a product of the Cold War and its original purpose reflected this. By 
the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the organization, which was founded in 1949, had 
achieved its three main goals, “countering the military threat that the Soviet Union posed 
to western Europe and North America,” (Barany 2006, 165), along with preventing “the 
revival of nationalist militarism in Europe…and encouraging European political 
integration” (“A Short History of NATO”). As such, the alliance could, potentially, have 
been disbanded. “With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its concomitant grip over 
eastern Europe,” Leonard concurs, “some critics argued that NATO lost its reason for 
being” (Leonard 2000, 519). Writing in 1992, Charles L. Glaser stated that, since the end 
of the Cold War brought “The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces from Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union,” the military threat 
facing the West was greatly reduced; moreover, it was “widely believed that Russia is 
uninterested in attacking the West. These changes,” Glaser argued, “allow the United 
States and its NATO allies to make substantial reductions in the military forces dedicated 
to deterring Russian attack” (Glaser 1992, 533). He also supported the view that “the 
United States should emphasize policies that encourage the evolution and stabilization of 
Russian goals that improve the long-term prospects for peace;” and as “the end of the 
cold war essentially eliminates a military requirement for the United States to deploy 
forces in Europe,” Glaser asserts, “it creates instead a political role for American military 
forces in a new European security structure” (Glaser 1992, 533-534). Others went farther 
than simply suggesting a political restructuring of NATO, proposing instead the complete 
eradication of the alliance (Steel, Ronald). 
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Outliving NATO’s Purpose 
Long before the Cold War ended, scholars foresaw the Organization would one 
day lose its purpose and thereby cease to exist. As early as 1964, Ronald Steel predicted 
NATO’s demise: the Organization’s “mission, the defense of Europe, was completed in 
Nikita Khrushchev’s time…as normal, if often hostile51, relations prevailed between the 
Western and Eastern blocs. NATO had lost its function and should dissolve” (Kaplan 
1995, 4). Lawrence Kaplan notes that many “pundits looking beyond the Cold War have 
decided that NATO will dissolve, or should dissolve [as] a new world order would make 
the old alliance unnecessary” leading to “successor organizations [that] would replace 
NATO’s function” (Kaplan 1995, 18-19). But contrary to expectations, this did not 
happen. Given the prevalence of such views that proved drastically mistaken, it is 
important to explore why NATO survived, who its opponents were and why, why 
alternate organizations did not successfully replace the alliance, and what effects 
NATO’s expansion has had on east-west relations. 
Part of the explanation for why NATO did not immediately dissolve lies in the 
turbulent nature of the Cold War’s end. The rise of ethnic conflict “among the newly 
independent nations in the former Soviet empire [and] insecurity among the former 
Eastern European satellites of that empire,” along with the general disarray and 
widespread resentment witnessed in Europe at the time, meant NATO remained a 
reassuring force of military security for many Europeans (Kaplan 1995, 19). There was 
also the unsurprising fact that thousands of highly-paid and well-connected NATO 
administrators, officials and other employees resisted the dissolution of the alliance 
(Barany 2006, 165). In 1995, Kaplan therefore predicted that NATO would not 
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disintegrate, and two decades later he has been proven correct. He also correctly 
hypothesized that the previously “unsatisfactory partnership with Eastern Europe [would] 
be replaced by membership;” however, he was wrong, sadly, when he wrote that, as 
“Russia discovers that America’s presence in Europe through NATO is a stabilizing force 
it will become more accepting of the Western alliance” (Kaplan 1995, 20). So how did 
Kaplan and liberals like him justify the alliance’s continued existence and growth? 
Liberal Support For Expansion 
Liberals defend expansionism of NATO based on several arguments. First, there 
was and still is a widespread belief that this move will deter Russian aggression. Second, 
the idea that this would “reduce the likelihood of conflict among NATO members, 
ameliorating security dilemmas and forcing them to accept current borders and pursue the 
peaceful resolution of disputes” was widespread (Reiter 2001, 41). Additionally, as 
President Clinton told the 1997 West Point graduating class, he believed “that the 
extension eastward strengthened democracy, civilian control of the military and provided 
added security for the United States” (Leonard 2000, 520). Most fundamental to the pro-
expansionist argument is Democratic Peace Theory, which leads liberals to conclude that 
expanding NATO “would further democratization in the region, which in turn would help 
to stabilize the area because democracies are unlikely to fight each other” (Reiter 2001, 
41). Democratic Peace Theory maintains that “true democracies do not invade one 
another and do not engage in aggressive wars” (Jeane Kirkpatrick qtd. in Reiter 2001, 
41). Justification for expansion overwhelmingly came from liberal American voices. The 
Clinton administration used this theory, maintaining “that one of the chief goals of 
expansion was ‘locking in democracy’s gains in Central Europe,’ because ‘democracies 
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resolve their differences peacefully’” (Mearsheimer 2014, 9). President Clinton also 
claimed “that NATO could ‘do for Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West: prevent 
a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats’ and create the 
conditions for prosperity” (Barany 2006, 167). Former Deputy Secretary of State during 
the Clinton Administration, Strobe Talbott, agreed, maintaining that “Moving the borders 
of NATO eastward…would help ‘to solidify the national consensus for democratic and 
market reforms’ that already existed in states like Hungary and Poland and thus enhance 
the prospects for peace in the region” (Mearsheimer 2014, 9). The challenge, according to 
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State from 1997 until 2001, was “to finish the post-war 
construction project…[and] expand the area of the world in which American interests and 
values will thrive” (Mearsheimer 2014, 9). Talbott also claimed “that collective defence 
remained an imperative and should be extended to the newly independent democracies. 
True, the threat NATO had been created to counter had been eliminated, but new threats 
could arise ‘that would require NATO to protect its members and to deter attack’” 
(MccGwire 2008, 1283). This clearly indicates a fear of a resurgent Russia which liberals 
believed an expanded NATO that included former Warsaw Pact countries would be better 
able to counter were it to become a threat. Aside from the general liberal belief in the 
importance and benefits of international institutions, the spread of democracy and the fear 
of a resurgent Russia are the two most significant hallmarks of liberal support for NATO 
extension. 
NATO and Democracy…Or Not? 
Whether this expansion actually spreads democracy is a matter of importance, to 
both liberals and realists, because the alliance’s growth was heavily reliant upon the 
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principle of spreading and strengthening “democracy in former communist states” (Reiter 
2001, 44). In fact, the democracy argument was touted by all advocates of enlargement 
and the main justification for it. Reiter, a realist, does concede that, if valid, “the claim 
that NATO enlargement will spread democracy…would be the strongest argument in 
support of such action” (Reiter 2001, 46). But does it do so? 
NATO could bring democratization in a variety of ways. First and foremost, the 
prospect of membership could serve as a tantalizing carrot which would prompt 
democratization in NATO-aspiring countries. Conversely, there can be no carrot without 
a stick. If member states adopted democratic reforms and subsequently reverted to 
authoritarian rule, NATO should be able to credibly threaten them with expulsion.3 
However, while many other organizations have provisions for the expulsion of states that 
revert to autocracy, as Reiter points out, “there is no legal basis for the ejection of a state 
from NATO, within the North Atlantic Treaty or elsewhere” (Reiter 2001, 52). Lastly, 
NATO membership could “help to solidify civilian control of the military [as] Alliance 
membership will be contingent upon institutionalizing…civilian control of the military” 
which tends to prevent military coups and other militaristic threats to democracy (Reiter 
2001, 55). Furthermore, “membership in a democratic alliance, especially one that is 
highly institutionalized, provides an environment within which transgovernmental 
contacts between militaries can spread norms of civilian control of the military” (Reiter 
2001, 55). On all these points, the historical record shows little to no evidence that NATO 
itself is responsible for bringing about democratization. 
                                                          
3 Ostensibly, NATO has to at least pretend to care. In actuality, it appears as though the alliance does not 
care about reverting to authoritarianism, as demonstrated by the historical record. 
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By examining the cases of Turkey, Spain, Portugal and Greece in the Cold War 
era, Dan Reiter concludes there is little historical evidence in favor of NATO being a 
force for democracy. NATO membership, he writes, “has exerted only minimal influence 
on democratization. Regarding civil-military relations, NATO membership has generated 
disparate results [and there] is little support for either the carrot or stick arguments. 
NATO has never sanctioned, much less ejected, a state for domestic political changes, but 
not because it lacked opportunity” (Reiter 2001, 58-59). This fact lends credence to the 
realist idea that NATO is a rational actor which is much more concerned with strategy 
than ideology. The post-Cold War record is also examined. Yet once more, the evidence 
shows that “the promise of NATO membership [did not] speed the democratization 
process in” Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which entered NATO in March 
1999, “because their societies and their elites were committed to democracy anyway,” as 
these states “had made long strides toward democracy even before the NATO carrot was 
dangled before them” (Reiter 2001, 59-60). In these cases, it appears as though 
democracy was the driver for seeking NATO membership, not vice-versa. The carrot 
argument is therefore dubitable, at best. Similarly, the military did not seriously threaten 
democracy in these states, also casting doubt unto the claim that NATO membership can 
democratize countries by improving civilian control of their militaries. Reiter notes that 
the countries seeking membership in 2000 were all fairly democratic already.4 Dan Reiter 
concludes “that NATO membership has not and will not advance democratization in 
                                                          
4 This can be confirmed by delving into Freedom House’s ratings for these countries. In 2002, Albania was 
found to be partly free, with a score of 3.5. In 2015, the country was still only partly free, its score having 
improved only slightly, to a 3.0. Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were 
already considered free as early as 1999. 
Macedonia, which applied for membership but did not obtain it, was found partly free in 2015, with a score 
of 3.5, improving from a score of 4 in 2002. (Freedom House). 
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Europe” (Reiter 2001, 42). Other IGOs, particularly the EU, are seen as more powerful 
forces for democratization, whose eastward expansion appear less injurious to Russia 
than NATO’s,5 which would allow for both the spread of democracy in the region while 
maintaining fairly healthy relations between Russia and the West. 
Pursuing Expansion Regardless 
Despite all of the contentions, protests and prospects for conflict expansion posed, 
NATO chose to pursue this policy. NATO was one of the many institutions that the West 
could build upon to expand its influence throughout the world, and the West seized this 
opportunity. Charles A. Kupchan writes that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, “The 
United States and Europe promptly teamed up to integrate their former adversaries into 
the Western order. The European Union and NATO opened their doors to the new 
democracies of Central Europe” (Kupchan 2012, 73). G. John Ikenberry corroborates 
this, as he claims that the “first post-Cold War impulse of the George H. W. Bush 
administration in the early 1990s was to…build and expand regional and global 
institutions,” across both “security and economic areas” (Ikenberry 2011, 232). Part of 
this strategy involved “the evolution of NATO to include associate relations with 
countries to the east” (Ikenberry 2011, 232). By the end of the 1990s, “The first round of 
NATO expansion was accomplished, providing an institutional basis to stabilize and 
embed new entrants into the Western order…The Bush [Senior] administration was 
determined that NATO stay engaged on the European continent and do so with the 
United States in the lead, perpetuating its role as a stabilizing presence” (Ikenberry 2011, 
234-35). While it is often believed that the West’s main goal was to “integrate the 
                                                          
5 It is important to note that Russia does oppose Ukrainian membership in the European Union. 
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Soviets (and Russians) into pan-European and pan-Atlantic institutions[,] the 
evidence…does not show that integration of the Soviets into new or existing institutions 
was dominant in 1990. Rather, the goal was to get the Soviets out” (Sarotte 2010, 135). 
Three countries acceded to the alliance at the end of the twentieth century. This 
move was largely guided by the United States, which some saw as having too much 
influence in post-war European affairs. The U.S. largely “assumed NATO’s leadership 
often to the consternation of its allies who wanted a larger role in the formulation of 
policies and in the decision making process” (Leonard 2000, 519). Of course, nations 
wanted to join the alliance, independent of the United States’ desires. “The sources of 
demand for IGO membership,” write Donno, Metzger and Russett, are clear, “States with 
transitional or fragile domestic institutions, or those in need of greater international 
legitimacy, desire membership in order to ensure peace, enhance their credibility, and 
reap the benefits of multilateral cooperation” (Donno et al. 2015, 251). This is why, 
although the United States shares the greatest responsibility for NATO expansion, it is 
important not to discount the role new or prospective members played themselves. 
According to Thomas Leonard, “In April 1993…Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, 
respectively the Presidents of the Czech Republic and Poland, urged new US President 
Bill Clinton to expand NATO eastward” (Leonard 2000, 518). This was not a decision to 
be taken lightly, but after “months of wrangling among the president’s advisors, 
agreement was reached to move forward cautiously” (Leonard 2000, 518). This “post–
Cold War vision of the alliance” as Clinton envisioned it, “specifically [included] former 
Warsaw Pact nations” (Reiter 2001, 43). 
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Subsequently, “at the July 1997 Madrid summit, NATO invited the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland to negotiations over their membership” (Reiter 2001, 43). 
Out of the initial twelve nations that expressed an interest at the outset, these three were 
deemed “qualified because of their firm democratic footing, market economies and 
settlement of boundary and ethnic conflicts with their neighbors” (Leonard 2000, 520). In 
March 1999, they officially joined as NATO’s newest members, which some argued 
insured lasting peace for twentieth and twenty-first century Europe. There were even 
some who “held out hope that Russia might continue to democratize and eventually 
become eligible for membership!” (Leonard 2000, 523). Russia is often treated as a 
special case, but some liberals insist that the Russian government should instead be 
encouraged “to apply for NATO membership,” and the alliance “should help Russia carry 
out the far-reaching political and military changes that would eventually qualify it to 
enter the alliance. The mere prospect of joining NATO,” Kramer contends, “would give a 
salutary fillip to the frequently stalled processes of democratization and military reform 
in Russia, and would strengthen the hand of pro-Western forces” (Kramer 2002, 732). 
Though Russia joining the alliance was always a far stretch, which has proven too 
optimistic, it is still laregly believed that NATO is a force for peace and cooperation. 
Next Up…The Baltics 
When the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland officially joined the alliance, in 
1999, this invited backlash in Russia. Alexei Arbatov, former deputy chairman of 
Russia’s parliamentary defense committee warned “that Russia has historic grievances 
with” the three new member countries and insisted “that Russia should have been 
consulted regarding their admission to NATO” (Leonard 2000, 524-25). After those three 
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nations were accepted, nine more countries applied for membership in 2002. Today, eight 
of those are NATO members.6 Russia had, from the very start, unequivocally stated its 
opposition to the accession of the Baltic states to the alliance. Unlike Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech Republic which “are buffeted by other nations from the Russian 
boundaries…Estonia and Latvia border directly upon Russia and a third [Baltic nation], 
Lithuania, is adjacent to Kaliningrad, an important Russian Baltic Sea outlet. Bulgaria 
and Romania,” for their part, “are strategically located on the Black Sea,” hence why 
Russia perceived this eastern encroachment as a threatening move (Leonard 2000, 225). 
Of those countries applying for membership in 2002, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia’s 
situation “was complicated because they [had been] republics of the Soviet Union until 
August 1991” (Kramer 2002, 731). NATO itself had “rejected the Baltic states initially 
because their armed forces [did] not meet NATO’s standards and,” most importantly, 
because they had “problems with their Russian minorities and with Russia” (Blank 1998, 
115). Because “any NATO movement into the Baltic region is likely to aggravate [anti-
Western] attitudes [in Moscow] and create an irreconcilably suspicious and hostile 
atmosphere between Russia and the West—one that could result in a Russian return to 
Cold War postures and policies,” there was strong opposition to Baltic NATO 
membership (Kramer 2002, 747). Liberals object, saying opponents of expansion “greatly 
overstate the damaging effect that the admission of the Baltic states will have on 
Russian–Western relations” (Kramer 2002, 747). 
                                                          
6 Macedonia did not obtain NATO membership. 
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Although, as aforementioned, there had been reticence due to the fear of 
antagonizing Moscow, “the extension of NATO membership to the Baltic states during 
the second round of enlargement [had, by 2001], become far more plausible and indeed 
probable,” thanks to small but significant changes in NATO, the Baltic states and 
Russia’s position (Kramer 2002, 731). The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks were 
partially responsible for a rapprochement between Russia and the west. Even before 9/11, 
Russia had begrudgingly shifted its attitude stating in  
The ‘Foreign Policy Concept’ promulgated by the Russian government in 
July 2000…that ‘Russia sees good prospects for the development of 
relations with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania…’ The document set two 
preconditions for good relations with the Baltic states: first, that Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania must respect Russian interests…and second, that the 
Baltic governments must uphold the rights of Russian and Russian-
speaking minorities (Kramer 2002, 747). 
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Despite sustained objections from realists, liberals maintained that “The entry of the 
Baltic states into NATO” was a positive move, but one that “should be accompanied by a 
gradual reorientation of the alliance. Rather than preserving NATO permanently as a 
predominantly military organization, the member states should increasingly emphasize its 
political role” (Kramer 2002, 732). Barany agrees, favoring expansionism as a diplomatic 
and common security effort rather than a military one (Barany 2006, 167). There was a 
subsequent shift in the nature of NATO from a heavy military focus to a political one—if 
Eastern European states were to be incorporated into the alliance, it had to be a political 
decision (Barany, 2006 167). Although “Russia still opposed the admission of the Baltic 
states into NATO, [it] would not stake its whole relationship with the West on this issue,” 
as Russian president Vladimir Putin and others had realized the Baltics would, no matter 
what, join NATO (Kramer 2002, 748). This move toward greater acceptance of NATO, 
though it had started around 1997, was ‘helped along’, so to speak, by Al Qaeda’s 
September 11th attacks. 
NATO and Russia/NATO vs. Russia 
9/11, as terrible an event as it was, also provided an opening for improved east-
west relations. Some scholars, including Peter B. Zwack, thought the time was 
“opportune to consider establishing a tangible, combined NATO and Russian military 
entity to jointly face the challenges of the post-9/11 world,” which would also lead to an 
overall improvement of relations (Zwack 2004, 89). A NATO-Russia Brigade or a 
NATO-Russia Contingency Command would have been “a major step forward both 
symbolically and functionally for NATO and Russia” (Zwack 2004, 91). Neither Russia 
nor NATO and its members are ready for the political leap of granting the former 
45 
memberhsip in the alliance, and it would be a particularly hard sell for member states 
which are former Soviet sattelites. But by most accounts, by the time 1997 rolled around, 
NATO-Russian political-military relations had dramatically improved, despite 
“remaining pressures in the relationship,” to the point that the “Russian 
government…recognized that stability with the West, including enhanced cooperation 
with NATO, is essential for Russia’s development and security” (Zwack 2004, 94). This 
became even more obvious after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks, as Putin himself declared 
that NATO “bears serious responsibility for maintaining stability in the world” (Zwack 
2004, 94). The fact that Russia and the rest of the western world have converging 
interests, in the form of stability in south-central Eurasia, particularly the Middle East, 
could also have been, and for a time was, a force for cooperation. 
Important to liberals’ ideas is the notion that Russia has been and remains a 
serious threat. Harvey Waterman asserts, that some states, “especially the Baltic 
countries, still face Russian bullying in the form of overt military threats as well as 
threats to do economic harm…Indeed,” Waterman insists, “for some the failure to 
achieve NATO membership may itself be a source of destabilization, because they think 
that membership in Western organizations might help them resist the Russians. These 
states want all the insurance they can get” (Waterman et al. 2001, 222). Realists 
challenge this claim that NATO expansion has the potential to deter future Russian 
aggression. Russian ambitions in the immediate post-Cold War were rather limited, and 
aside from a few ultranationalists, there was no impetus for aggression toward the 
country’s neighbors. Furthermore, “The breakup of the Soviet Union left it…without the 
military strength to confront the west. The Russian army fell into disarray, its naval fleet 
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into disrepair and its nuclear weaponry available for sale” (Leonard 2000, 519). In other 
words, Russia “exhibited no inclination to rebuild the Soviet empire through threats or 
force, especially against the states that have formally applied for NATO membership,” 
and it also lacked the ability to do so, hence the argument that joining the alliance was a 
form of defense for those states was moot (Reiter 2001, 46). Russia in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries had lost its great power status, and having limited 
capabilities, it posed no serious military threat to its former satellites. 
Realist Critique of Expansion 
Realists offer a wide set of counterarguments which dispute liberals’ optimistic 
predictions about the effects and benefits of NATO expansion. Reiter offers but one anti-
enlargement argument when he writes that “The weakness of the democratization 
argument, coupled with the costs and risks of further enlargement, caution against pursuit 
of this policy in the near or medium term. Instead,” he suggests, “the West should rely on 
the European Union (EU) to spread democracy, an approach that is more likely to foster 
democratization yet less likely to alienate Russia” (Reiter 2001, 42)7. Moreover, realists 
are skeptical, at best, about the veracity of Democratic Peace Theory, making the 
democratization argument all but worthless in their eyes. Particularly, realists insist on 
debunking what they view as the erroneous assumption that NATO deters Russian 
aggression, rather, they contend, the alliance’s expansion stokes it. Notably, there is a 
prevalent worry that “expansion may jeopardize relations between Russia and the West, 
pushing Russia away from cooperating on issues such as strategic arms control and 
peacekeeping in the Balkans, and perhaps turning it back toward belligerence and even 
                                                          
7 Again, Ukraine is somewhat a special case, although the prospect of NATO membership is arguably more 
antagonizing to Russia than EU membership. 
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ultranationalism” (Reiter 2001, 42). There are scholars who would argue this has already 
happened, or that this trend is currently underway. 
But even if one were to dismiss these arguments, the real financial costs 
associated with NATO expansion are significant, and it was unlikely (and some would 
argue this has largely proven true) that new members would contribute much to the 
alliance. Additionally, having more members complicates the decision-making process 
and renders reaching a consensus more difficult. The cultural aspects of the problem 
should not be underestimated either. Although they may not be as significant a hurdle nor 
a pressing potential problem, the desire to socialize prospective and actual member 
countries—their population, but their militaries especially—into Western norms might be 
both naïve and, in a sense, dangerous. Waterman writes, enlargement can “contribute to 
regional political order, and co-opt younger generations into Western norms and 
perspectives” (Waterman et al. 2001, 227). This can lead to clashes between the old and 
young generations of a country or region.8 There are many cautionary historical tales of 
the problems (attempted) westernization of cultures may entail, 9 and these ought to be 
considered, even in Eastern Europe, despite the apparent will of some, perhaps even 
many, to adopt western norms. 
While some analysts still worry about a revival of Russian nationalism and, along 
with it, a rebuilding of its military power, “this prospect does not justify NATO 
enlargement;” especially since “NATO enlargement is likely to increase the chances of 
renewed Russian belligerence, rather than provide a useful insurance policy against 
it…enlargement will jeopardize the West’s relationship with Russia” (Reiter 2001, 47-
                                                          
8 As recently witnessed in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 
9 For instance, see Afghanistan. 
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48). Despite popular opinion, realists do not favor aggressive and belligerent policies, 
rather they emphasize caution, often referred to as prudence. This means that restraint 
should be exercised by world leaders, and that idealism needs to be put aside at times 
(Mazarr 2003, 505). Ideologically, pushing NATO’s borders eastward would represent 
the strength and unity of democracy, and establish long-lasting peace through the spread 
of western values against Russian authoritarianism and repression. Practically speaking, 
however, it is prudent to halt the Organization’s eastward push, because it aggravates the 
Russian government and anti-Western sentiments in the country, heightening tensions 
and therefore the risk of conflict. Although many “see NATO as an insurance policy 
against future Russian expansion westward,” others “argue that NATO’s eastward thrust 
will more likely produce a nationalistic response in Russia and rekindle its interests in 
eastern Europe” (Leonard 2000, 535). In the twenty-first century, it is often forgotten that 
“Expansion eastward also violated promises made in 1990 to Mikhail Gorbachev;” but 
the insult to Russia did not stop there, “At the Madrid summit, the Ukraine signed a 
[charter with NATO which] provided for the establishment of information offices in 
Brussels and Kiev and for the consultation on a variety of issues including civil 
emergency planning and nuclear safety” (Leonard 2000, 524). Predictably, this stirred 
renewed rumblings of discontent in Russia. 
John J. Mearsheimer, the quintessential realist, summarizes Russia’s position on 
the matter, highlighting the fact that “Russia was deeply opposed to NATO expansion, 
which it viewed as a serious threat to Russian security” (Mearsheimer 2014, 50). Reiter 
similarly cautions that further enlargement is likely to cause greater damage to Russia-
West relations than previous rounds of expansion. Indeed, in 2000, President Putin 
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declared that “‘the expansion of military alliances’ poses a threat to Russia’s borders,” 
meaning enlargement might push “Russian leaders away from the belief that the West is a 
trustworthy partner in cooperation” (Reiter 2001, 49). While liberals firmly believe that 
“Should [U.S.] intervention [in Europe] be called for again, a prior commitment to 
NATO can be expected to facilitate cooperation by the countries of the region” 
(Waterman et al. 2001, 226), realists would argue this intervention might only become 
necessary because of NATO and the perceived threat it poses to Russia. 
But warnings were not heeded and NATO expanded. This potentially dangerous 
move was decried by some in American politics. Indeed, in June 1997, fifty U.S. officials 
and experts stated in an open letter to President Clinton, “their belief that ‘the current US-
led effort to expand NATO…is a policy error of historic importance’” (MccGwire 2008, 
1282). They believed that, in Russia, it would “strengthen the nondemocratic opposition 
[as] NATO expansion continued to be opposed across the whole political spectrum in 
Russia” (MccGwire 2008, 1282). Gregory O. Hall corroborates this, writing that, “From 
the outset, Russian leaders and commentators from across the country’s political and 
ideological spectrum have stood in strong opposition to the prospect of NATO expanding 
its membership eastward, especially into the former USSR” (Hall 1999, 23). 
Furthermore, expansion “would draw a new line of division” in Europe, “would degrade 
the alliance’s ability to carry out its primary mission,” and in the U.S. there would be 
debate over the costs such an expansion would entail (MccGwire 2008, 1282). Other 
officials expressed concerns that this policy 
risked endangering the long-term viability of NATO, significantly 
exacerbating the instability that [existed] in the zone that lies between 
Germany and Russia, and convincing most Russians that the United States 
and the West [were] attempting to isolate, encircle, and subordinate them, 
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rather than integrating them into a new European system of collective 
security (MccGwire 2008, 1283). 
 
The “extension of NATO,” some found, was “an illogical business” (MccGwire 2008, 
1284). Not only were Russians wary of such a move by the West—“it is generally 
acknowledged that Moscow is very worried by the hostile implications of NATO 
expansion and that Russia has ‘legitimate concerns’ about this development”—but 
additionally, “in 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev was given top-level assurances that the West 
would not enlarge NATO, ensuring a non-aligned buffer zone between NATO’s eastern 
border and Russia” (MccGwire 2008, 1285). The Soviet leader, “Gorbachev and [former 
Chancellor of Germany, Helmut] Kohl had essentially already reached a gentleman’s 
agreement on February 10 [1990],” whereby “Kohl told Gorbachev that NATO would 
not expand eastward, and the Soviet leader agreed to internal German economic and 
monetary union, a process that had already begun” (Sarotte 2010, 120). Gorbachev even 
called “for a new post–Cold War pan-European security structure. He hoped for an 
organization that, while yet ill-defined, would stretch from the shores of the Atlantic to 
his country” (Sarotte 2010, 111). These hopes and assurances were, in the end, all for 
naught. 
A Russia-Inclusive NATO and other Optimistic Alternatives 
While it was suggested that, in the post-Cold War world, “a German federation 
would exist outside of NATO…the [existing] Western structures proved most useful to 
the search by all major states for mechanisms of restraint, reassurance, and integration” 
(Ikenberry 2011, 232). But the idea that this meant the creation of a “wider pan-European 
security structure that would also include the Soviet Union” was shunned, leaving Russia 
out of a common European security alliance (Ikenberry 2011, 232). And yet, MccGwire 
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wrote in 2008, “It is officially accepted that there is no Russian threat to the [Central and 
Eastern European] states for the next decade or more. And there is universal agreement 
that the security of Europe requires the integration of the republics of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU), especially Russia, into a stable security system” (MccGwire 2008, 1285). 
Unfortunately, through lack of political efforts on both sides, early hopes that Russia 
would be effectively included in a new defensive and democratic alliance, encompassing 
the U.S. and all European states, were dashed, and such an expansive partnership never 
came to life (Israelyan 1998, 47). In the long-run, it can be assumed such a partnership 
would have been more advantageous, as the eastern giant would, or at least could, have 
been more thoroughly included in the post-Cold War order, perhaps leading to less 
resentment. Although it is up for debate whether Russia truly had an interest in such an 
alliance, the fact that Gorbachev supported a pan-European security alliance and that 
Russia later sponsored an expanded Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe—as detailed below—indicates the country did have an inclination for a combined 
east-west defense system. The resulting greater inclusion could potentially have led to a 
rapprochement of values and to the creation of common, rather than conflicting, goals. 
Russia sought to replace the U.S.-led NATO as “the central organizing pillar of 
European security” with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) (Mearsheimer 2014, 50).  Indeed, “Russian leaders emphasize the necessity for a 
joint Russian-Western role in devising and maintaining a framework for European 
security into the twenty-first century. However, such a mechanism, in the opinion of 
many Russian observers, should emanate from an evolved Organization for Security and 
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Cooperation in Europe” (Hall 1999, 23). Moscow has advocated for “a Russian-led CIS10 
as an equal pillar with NATO in European security under the OSCE’s supervision,” this 
would allow Russia veto power to “safeguard its sphere of influence and restrain 
NATO’s freedom of action” (Blank 1998, 118). But, Mearsheimer notes, instead of 
pursuing this route, 
Recognizing that Russia’s weakness would preclude any retaliation…the 
United States ignored Russia’s concerns and pushed NATO to accept the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as new members. Russia has also 
opposed U.S. policy in the Balkans over the past decade, especially 
NATO’s 1999 war against Yugoslavia. Again, the United States paid little 
attention to Russia’s concerns (Mearsheimer 2014, 49-50). 
 
Ikenberry remarks, “the expansion of NATO membership into Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet sphere drove” the growth of the United States’ alliance partners, resulting 
in “a global alliance system that has steadily expanded worldwide” (Ikenberry 2011, 
238). Russia, evidently, did not become a partner in this system. Mearsheimer states 
plainly “Russia and the United States have not worked together to create the present order 
in Europe” (Mearsheimer 2014, 49). This lack of cooperation is a mistake. While it is 
understandable why neither side was ever too enthusiastic about the prospect of a U.S.-
Russia defense alliance, it is also unfortunate, as such an alliance would not only be 
powerful, but could have avoided some of the conflicts which have arisen between these 
two nations in the twenty-first century. There would certainly have been significant 
obstacles in the way of this happening, notably a probably inevitable divergence of 
interest between east and west. But events, such as 9/11, can lead to a convergence of 
said interests, as was observed in the early 2000s. The difficulty in both creating and 
                                                          
10 Commonwealth of Independent States 
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maintaining such a prospectively far-reaching alliance are not to be underestimated, as 
noted below. 
Prospects for a coalition that included Russia and satisfied both east and west 
were not always so bleak. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), today OSCE, is in fact, “the only post-Cold War regional institution that seeks 
to include all of the European states;” the problem, however, is its weakness (Kay 1995, 
113). Although the OSCE could have been and, to a certain extent, has been, 
a very successful framework for promoting fundamental values of conflict 
prevention, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, freedom of 
movement, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
and peacekeeping operations…its structural inability to make or enforce 
decisions and its cumbersome membership of fifty-three states ranging 
from ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’ makes the CSCE very weak (Kay 1995, 
113). 
 
In the twentieth Century, the Russian Federation “embarked on a concerted effort to 
empower the CSCE as an alternative to NATO expansion,” but despite “the 
assertiveness in Russian foreign policy stressing the CSCE, any working security order 
in Europe must have NATO at its core” (Kay 1995, 113-14). As Europe faced 
“political, economic and military instabilities,” NATO was determined to be the 
organization most capable of returning stability (Kay 1995, 114). Sean Kay believed 
that NATO “expanding too soon could further encourage nationalists in Russia by 
conjuring up renewed concerns of encirclement,” and this appears to have indeed been 
the case (Kay 1995, 114). The Kremlin initiated a proposal where the CSCE “should 
take over the political coordination of peacekeeping missions organized by the CIS, 
NATO, the NACC, and the WEU,”11 but this “placed NATO states in the difficult 
                                                          
11 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Western 
European Union (WEU). 
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position of trying to balance the strong opposition of the Baltic states and the Ukraine, 
the reality that NATO would not assume such a broad regional role,12 and a need not 
to exacerbate Russian alienation over the growing public debate about possible NATO 
expansion” (Kay 1995, 120). There was reason to be hopeful as an equal NATO-CSCE 
partnership could have enhanced peace and stability in Europe. This could have 
satisfied Russia’s desire for an alternative form of security expansion across Europe. 
Furthermore, it could have allowed for pooling and optimized utilization of each 
organization’s resources, also helping in burden-sharing and tighter integration of 
states. In actuality, NATO’s power has generally grown, while the CSCE has been 
marginalized. 
Has NATO brought Stability or War? 
Whether NATO expansion has actually helped stability in the region of Eastern 
Europe is debatable. Multiple events since the Cold War’s end have demonstrated the 
potential for contention that NATO can sometimes exacerbate. “NATO’s interventions in 
the Balkans and the war against Serbia” in the 1990s is but one instance of such a pattern; 
“As diplomatic negotiations at the U.N. Security Council over the crisis in Kosovo 
unfolded in 1998, Russia refused to agree to authorization of military action in what was 
an internal conflict. In the absence of U.N. approval, an American-led NATO operation 
did intervene” (Ikenberry 2011, 247). To this day, Russia refuses to recognize Kosovo’s 
independence.13 Two subsequent and fairly recent Russia-NATO crises include the 
Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the Ukrainian civil war of 2014. Şafak Oğuz explains 
                                                          
12 Perhaps not the case anymore in 2016. 
13 It is interesting to note, however, that Russia has (rather cynically) used Kosovo as evidence that its 
annexation of Crimea was within international legal realms. Russia also used Kosovo as justification in the 
cases of de facto states Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
55 
that “Russia occupied Georgia, a NATO candidate, in 2008 and officially recognized two 
breakaway regions threatening Georgia’s territorial integrity” (Oğuz 2015, 1). Five years 
later, a similar scenario played out in Ukraine, another NATO candidate state. 
Troublesome for Russia was the 2008 Bucharest Summit which “became a cornerstone 
for the membership process. Leaders ‘welcomed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations for membership in NATO and agreed that these countries will become 
members of NATO;’” this decision “pushed the limits of Russian flexibility. The risk, in 
Moscow’s eyes, was that the candidacies of Georgia and Ukraine would now start to gain 
momentum and become unstoppable” (Oğuz 2015, 3). This had previously been a 
concern of the West as well—“NATO’s existing members consistently decline to…set 
[Georgia] on the road to membership, out of concern over its ongoing risk of conflict 
with Russia” (Donno et al. 2015, 251). Donno et al. argue the reticence regarding 
Georgian admission is due to “Georgia’s level of security risk [which] is high [as] It is 
located in an unfriendly neighborhood, with contested borders, ruled by a government 
with questionable democratic credentials, and, perhaps most important, locked in an 
adversarial relationship with Russia” (Donno et al. 2015, 253). But these worries seemed 
to wane as the western world grew more confident and relations with Russia improved. 
Hence, in 2008, “NATO affirmed an intention to admit the country [Georgia] 
eventually;” the subsequent Georgian war, however, “created even stronger opposition—
particularly from Germany, France, and other Western European members—to any 
further steps toward integration” (Donno et al. 2015, 253). 
Unfortunately, it was this caution, which fizzled out at the 2008 Bucharest 
summit, that allowed for more relaxed relations. The mere possibility of extending 
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NATO’s sphere into Georgia broke this cycle, leading to reactionary rhetoric and actions. 
Frustrated and on guard, “Russia, based on the lessons learned in Kosovo, declared 
Georgia as part of its sphere of interest and as one of its red lines in reference to NATO’s 
expansion. [As noted,] The Alliance…ignored Russia’s warnings” (Oğuz 2015, 10). 
Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, is far from innocent in causing the war, and 
Georgia’s use of violence in South Ossetia was deemed unjustifiable by the international 
community. Russia found the defense of its ethnic population abroad warranted 
intervention. NATO, meanwhile, failed to take a strong stand against Saakashvili. 
Despite Georgian violence, the organization maintained its commitment to help move the 
country closer to membership. The situation devolved rapidly, “President Dimitri 
Medvedev issued a statement emphasizing that Russia will provide effective assistance to 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia because of NATO’s decision. The head of the Russian 
Military Staff stated that Russia will do everything (necessary) to prevent Georgia from 
joining NATO,” and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov highlighted that “Russia would do 
its utmost not to allow Georgia and Ukraine into NATO” (Oğuz 2015, 3). Russia-West 
relations did slowly and progressively improve again, until 2014, when Russia invaded 
Crimea. 
The question of Ukrainian NATO membership is particularly problematic. At the 
2002 “Prague Summit, NATO Secretary-General Robertson said that it would probably 
take another 5 years before Ukraine, a country with enormous political and economic 
problems, to say nothing of its habitual human rights violations, could join the Alliance” 
(Barany 2006, 173). These types of prospective offers worry Russia—after all, had 
Robertson been right, Ukraine could have contemplated NATO membership as early as 
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2007. Unfortunately, there seems to be some inability on the part of the western world to 
recognize that Russia views NATO as an actual and legitimate threat to its security. 
Although most western liberals find it unpleasant to admit this, strategically speaking, it 
makes sense for Russia to be worried. In the post-Cold War, the West has persisted “in 
treating Moscow as its main rival in the post-Soviet space,” and NATO’s continued push 
to the East means Russia has found “itself [completely] surrounded by unfriendly states,” 
those NATO countries or otherwise West-reliant countries in the West and in Northeast 
Asia, the highly unstable Middle Eastern world to the south, and elsewhere in Asia, 
Russia is confronted by the rise of China, “whose power and influence are leaping ahead, 
but whose future political and military course…remain uncertain” (Israelyan 1998, 57). 
Ukraine’s accession to NATO is, ergo, one of the most controversial and 
contentious subjects of expansion, especially because “Ukraine has many more, stronger, 
and longer-standing historical, linguistic, economic, social ties to Russia than any other 
former Russian republic” (Barany 2006, 174). Some argue NATO membership for 
Ukraine “would be a dangerous and completely counterproductive step,” because the 
“relationship between Ukraine and Russia” is of utmost importance (Lieven 1997, 55). 
Ukrainian and Russian intellectuals argue that “Pursuing classical ‘balance of power’ 
tactics against Russia would result in the unnecessary economic and psychological 
exhaustion of Ukraine…A belief that Ukraine should consistently oppose Russia on the 
international stage is erroneous” and it would therefore be “more reasonable and 
beneficial to move toward the European Union and the non-military structures of NATO 
independently but in parallel,” but above all, “A non-confrontational strategy concerning 
Russia is warranted” (Lieven 1997, 58). As Glaser warned two and a half decades ago, 
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“whatever benefits [NATO expansion] might provide must be weighed against the risk of 
increasing Russian insecurity. If expanding NATO into Eastern Europe increases Russian 
insecurity, Western security might also be reduced, for example, by increasing Russia’s 
incentives to exert control over former Soviet republics or former members of the 
Warsaw Pact” (Glaser 1992, 537). Sadly, this advice was not heeded. 
In 2012, Charles A. Kupchan seemed optimistic about the prospects of improved 
East-West relations. He first notes that Russia is a peculiar state, which “bolsters its 
credentials as a counterweight to the West,” but while the Kremlin has “crossed swords 
with Washington over U.S. missile defense and NATO enlargement,” Russia might 
simultaneously, “be uniquely poised to help build bridges between the Western order and 
whatever comes next,” because “Moscow has a long history of diplomacy and 
engagement with the West, yet also considerable credibility among emerging powers” 
(Kupchan 2012, 111). At the time he wrote this, there was even a dialogue “under way 
about more fully anchoring Russia in the West, possibly through Russian membership in 
NATO” (Kupchan 2012, 111). Unfortunately, such a path to peaceful relations seems 
dreadfully damaged, if not destroyed, in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis. In fact, the 
Kremlin has cited NATO’s eastward expansion as justification for its assertiveness and 
renewed aggressiveness in Eastern Europe. 
Conclusion 
It is unfortunate the situation has devolved to such a point that reconciliation with 
Russia seems even more difficult to achieve than after the 2008 Georgian War. The 
question that mattered most when considering expansion was whether “further NATO 
enlargement would do lasting damage to…the internal politics of Russia and U.S. 
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relations with that country?” Waterman answered that this did “not seem likely, because 
enlargement is offensive to the Russians much more for its symbolism than for its 
invasion of a sphere of influence in which Russian influence has greatly waned” 
(Waterman et al. 2001, 225). Unfortunately, the symbolism and fear of a real invasion of 
this sphere appear to have been stronger than scholars, such as Waterman expected, 
especially in light of both the 2008 war with Georgia and the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. 
Kupchan believes Russia to be an important player in establishing a post-unipolar order, 
stating, “if the Atlantic community plays its cards right and succeeds in integrating 
Russia into its institutions, it may well find Moscow a particularly useful arbiter in 
negotiating the shape of a post-Western order” (Kupchan 2012, 111). It is much too late 
today to do away with NATO, and it is unlikely at most that it will cease to exist any time 
soon. Unfortunately, one cannot simply turn back time and change the past. Limited 
expansion14 that satisfied both the west and quelled Eastern European states’ fears while 
simultaneously avoiding stepping on Russia’s toes would have been optimal. This could 
have pleased all sides or, at the very least, would not have angered and ‘threatened’ 
Russia. But this was not the path history followed. As such, NATO’s expansionist policy 
was responsible, in part, for initiating the Ukraine crisis. 
  
                                                          
14 Ideally, this would have meant only the incorporation of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into 
the Alliance. At most, the Baltic states as well. 
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Chapter III - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Ukraine Crisis 
Introduction 
 Ukraine as it exists today is a rather young state which is plagued with 
conflictual internal divisions. These come in the form of cultural, linguistic, regional and 
ethnic cleavages and it can be easily argued that they are partly responsible for the 
country’s struggling or failing democracy. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, the west of the country used nationalistic pride and pro-west tendencies to rebel 
against their former ‘master’ while in the east and Crimea, which belonged to Russia 
from the 18th century until 1954, the people expressed strong Russian nationalism. This 
situation means that Ukrainian politics is heavily divided along those same ethnic and 
linguistic cleavages. Not only are there significant internal divisions, but the country is 
also caught between two giants, the West and Russia, vying for power and influence. 
Both have used economic, historical, political and ideological means to try to secure their 
goals. The military alignments of Ukraine and the defensive alliances seeking its 
membership are paramount. In particular, the relationship between the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, Russia and Ukraine has been a contentious subject which was partly 
responsible for the recent annexation of Crimea by Russia and the separatist rebellion in 
eastern Ukraine. 
 The Crimean peninsula was the flashpoint of the Ukraine crisis, in part due to its 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties to Russia, but especially because of its strategic 
value—which is the main reason it seems doomed, historically speaking, to be caught in 
the midst of wars, fought over, torn apart, traded and invaded. Its main strategic worth is 
its access to the Black Sea. In 2010, the Kharkov Accords were signed between 
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Yanukovych and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev—these renewed and 
extended the agreement allowing Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to be stationed in Sevastopol 
from 2017 to 2042. Given the prevalent anti-Russian leaning of the new government, and 
its pro-EU and pro-NATO nature, it seems likely the Accords would have been 
rescinded, posing a serious obstacle to Russia’s access to its Black Sea base in 
Sevastopol. It is therefore possible that, perhaps, fear of losing this strategic asset it what 
encouraged Russian President Vladimir Putin to annex Crimea. 
 Although the crisis began over whether the Ukrainian government should sign an 
economic deal with the EU or Russia, NATO’s role in the crisis is more telling and 
significant than the European Union’s. Mainly, this is due to the nature of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. While the European Union represents a real and serious 
economic competitor for Russia, especially were Ukraine to join this institution, NATO is 
a military alliance which has been Russia’s adversary since its very conception in 1949. 
The EU has no army and a poor track record on taking effective military action. Russia 
has real practical, tactical and strategic reasons to fear NATO encroachment into its 
sphere of influence, as a NATO-aligned Ukraine would expand this hostile military threat 
and bring it to one of Russia’s most important borders. 
Ukraine’s Political Pendulum 
In 2004, electoral fraud led to the election of pro-Russian candidate, Viktor 
Yanukovych. Ukraine was then swept up in a nation-wide peaceful protest against 
government corruption, which later became known as the Orange Revolution. It was 
successful in bringing to power the more progressive, pro-western candidate, Viktor 
Yushchenko. The latter had run on a platform that favored Ukrainian membership in 
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NATO. However, despite high hopes from his constituents, Yushchenko was not 
proactive and accomplished very little. He failed to successfully bring Ukraine closer to 
NATO or EU membership, and two years later, his opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, was 
elected, putting an end to such pursuits. Since the collapse of Yushchenko’s Orange 
Coalition, “Ukraine’s relations with NATO have emerged as a particularly divisive issue” 
(Larrabee 2007, 48). The country is heavily divided along regional lines regarding 
whether Ukraine ought to form deeper ties with the West or with Russia. These cleavages 
soon led to another political uprising. 
In 2014, during Yanukovych’s second term, another movement, Euromaidan, 
took root, but this one was led by only a minority, and violence spread along with it. The 
instability created as pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych was forced to flee the 
country led to a series of events, centered around Crimea and eastern Ukraine, which 
have negatively impacted relations between Russia and the West. For years, the Crimean 
peninsula has been predicted to be a point of contention. In a 2007 article, F. Stephen 
Larrabee notes, “Given Russia’s historical claims on Crimea and the fact that the majority 
of Crimea’s population is composed of ethnic Russians, many Ukrainians fear that 
Moscow could be tempted to exploit the latent separatist sentiment in Crimea as well as 
the ethnic tensions with the Tatars in order to increase Moscow’s leverage over Kyiv” 
(Larrabee 2007, 54). In 1997, Anatol Lieven predicted that “as long as the current order 
or anything like it remain[ed] in place, Ukraine [would] not be directly threatened with 
Russian conquest or subjugation,” but he warned, a “much greater potential threat comes 
from some combination of economic failure and a feeling of alienation on the part of the 
Russian and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine,” both of which were happening in 
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2014 (Lieven 1997, 74). Following Yanukovych’s overthrow and the introduction of anti-
Russian language laws, Russia annexed Crimea, the peninsula which was transferred to 
Ukraine by former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1954. This created an 
international uproar as Russia violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity and international 
norms of non-intervention and sovereignty. The actual and planned eastward expansion 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been accused of either being a 
cause for or hailed as a solution to the Ukraine crisis. 
Some argue NATO must expand to deter Russian imperialism while others view 
the organization as a source of Russian fears which can lead to greater insecurity and, 
consequently, aggressive defensiveness. This can be explained by the security dilemma. 
According to Barry Posen, because 
Relative power is difficult to measure and is often subjectively 
appraised[,] what seems sufficient to one state’s defence will seem, and 
will often be, offensive to its neighbours. Because neighbours wish to 
remain autonomous and secure, they will react by trying to strengthen 
their own positions. States can trigger these reactions even if they have no 
expansionist inclinations. This is the security dilemma: what one does to 
enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one 
less secure. Cooperation among states to mute these competitions can be 
difficult because someone else’s ‘cheating’ may leave one in a militarily 
weakened position. All fear betrayal (Posen 1993, 28). 
 
In order to determine which view, liberal or realist, is more applicable or correct, and 
what actions should be taken in order to maintain peace and stability in the region and 
among the West and Russia, several factors must be considered and examined. First, the 
motivation behind Russia’s actions is important to try to discern what its intentions and 
capabilities were and are regarding plans in Ukraine and the rest of Russia’s sphere of 
influence. Second, one must consider what factors indicate risks of further Russian 
hostilities and what indicates the contrary. Then it becomes crucial to determine whether 
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NATO expansion and greater military activity on Russia’s borders will deter Russian 
aggression or make it more likely by heightening tensions and stoking existing fears. 
The Kremlin does not appear to have plans, desires, or most importantly, the 
capacity to invade all of Ukraine or any NATO member country at this juncture in time. 
The invasions of Georgia in 2008 and of Ukraine in 2014 did not have for an end goal the 
occupation of the entire countries, as some western pundits suspected, instead, the Russo-
Georgian war and operations in eastern Ukraine were smaller-scale wars with a heavy 
reliance on propaganda and widespread use of information warfare rather than traditional 
modes of engagement. Also important in these cases are the domestic separatist elements, 
to which the conflicts have been largely confined. Russia’s annexation of Crimea was 
largely a strategic move, but with deep historical and cultural ties which are often 
neglected but are actually primordial in understanding Russian foreign policy. NATO’s 
eastward expansionism is an aggravating factor for Russia, and cooperation between the 
two should therefore be encouraged, with an easing of tensions and, on one end, respect 
for existing boundaries, principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and on the 
other, a scaling back of military activities and the termination of eastward expansion. 
Russia, Ukraine and the West—“It’s Complicated” 
Relations between Russia and the West have always been complicated. Since the 
fall of the Iron Curtain, they have been fighting for control and influence over Ukraine. 
The ethnically diverse country, and the Crimean peninsula in particular, have been widely 
identified as possibly explosive points of contention. As Vsevolod Samokhvalov points 
out, “Ukraine has been repeatedly described as an apple of discord, bone of contention 
and root of disagreement between Russia” and the West, including NATO and the 
65 
European Union (Samokhvalov 2015, 1371). Russia and the West (mainly through the 
EU and partly via NATO) have both tried to push and pull Ukraine to imitate them. This 
goes for the “political practices which correspond to their values, visions or interests,” as 
Ukraine is encouraged to mold its democracy according to two very different styles 
(Samokhvalov 2015, 1372). In the economic dimension too, “each of the two actors are 
trying to open Ukrainian markets for their economic agents and to create more favourable 
conditions for trans-border trade with Ukraine and economic activities in Ukraine” 
(Samokhvalov 2015, 1373). One cause of the Ukraine crisis was, indeed, disagreement 
over whether the country should sign an economic deal with Russia rather than the EU. 
On an ideological level too, Russia offers a very different model than Europe. On the one 
hand, Ukraine and Russia share a Soviet and communist past and have similar historical 
experiences. The West offers a more progressive and human-rights and rule of law-based 
approach. The Ukrainian government has often emphasized a “rejection of its Soviet past 
and history, focusing on its trauma and promotion of Ukrainian language” (Samokhvalov 
2015, 1373). This is an internally divisive issue as well, split along east-west lines. As 
with political and economic choices, the ideological courses Ukraine can choose from 
seem antithetical and mutually exclusive. 
As such, many of Ukraine’s nation-building decisions represent zero-sum games, 
whereby either Russia, or the West gains influence, power and money but seldom—if 
ever—can both prosper simultaneously. This is most evident in the security realm. As 
Samokhvalov states, “in the dimension of foreign policy and international security 
architecture, the EU and Russia seek to involve Ukraine in their security projects,” for 
instance, 
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the EU is seeking Ukraine’s alignment with the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) decisions and its participation in various Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, with possible formal 
NATO membership, whereas Russia is seeking to involve Ukraine both in 
integration processes in the post-Soviet space, in particular to [the] 
Eurasian Union and Russia-led European security architecture or, at least, 
to secure its neutrality. Given Russia’s sensitivity about Ukraine’s 
accession to NATO, the dilemma was also framed in zero-sum terms 
(Samokhvalov 2015, 1373). 
 
The potential of Ukrainian membership in NATO is perhaps the most controversial and 
zero-sum decision to face not only the country itself, but Russia and the West as well. 
It is widely recognized that Russia views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
as a threat and an enemy force. Putin has often emphasized his belief that “the West, and 
the United States in particular, represented threats to Russia;” something that was 
highlighted in “Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine [which] cites NATO enlargement as the 
greatest military danger, a theme repeated in the Military Doctrine that Putin approved in 
December 2014” (Kramer 2015, 12). Put differently, “Moscow sees itself in a permanent 
state of siege at the hands of a Western order that it believes is using nonmilitary as well 
as military forces against Russia” (Blank 2015, 69). Mearsheimer neatly summarizes the 
nature of this sentiment: “Russia’s deep-seated opposition to NATO expansion shows 
that it fears the idea of NATO’s conventional forces moving closer to its border. Russia 
obviously does not accept the argument that its powerful nuclear retaliatory force 
provides it with absolute security” (Mearsheimer 2014, 133) This is partly explained by 
the realist notion, also expressed by Mearsheimer, that great powers, due to the 
fundamental insecurity of their status as such and the constant threat of being outmatched 
and out-powered, are never satisfied with existing borders, which in Russia’s case have 
dramatically shrunk since the Cold War’s end. States therefore constantly seek to expand 
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their spheres of influence and to expand surrounding buffer zones in order to increase 
their security, hence why Russia seeks Ukraine’s alliance, or at least its neutrality. In 
sum, Russia feels NATO is a serious threat which it would be unable to combat 
successfully, and the country believes an attack by the Organization is not unbelievable 
or out of the question. 
It is also common knowledge that Russia is highly territorial, so to speak, and is 
uncomfortable with western encroachments into its sphere of influence, as explained 
above, particularly as it concerns both Georgia and Ukraine, two countries with which 
Russia has had rather violent disagreements in the recent past. Although it would be easy 
to say it was the Kremlin’s ambition alone that drove Russia to act as it did in the 
Georgian war, the annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis, this would be an unfair 
and reductive statement. There are many other confounding variables aside from 
imperialist ambitions. Indeed, 
Ukraine has many more, stronger, and longer-standing historical, 
linguistic, economic, social ties to Russia than any other former Russian 
republic. Public opinion polls conducted in late 2004 confirm that roughly 
half of Ukrainians…are saddened by the Soviet Union’s demise.15 
According to another survey, nearly 80% of Russians are convinced that 
Ukrainians and Belarusians are really Russians, and nearly 70% do not 
think that Ukraine is a genuine country (Barany 2006, 174). 
 
According to Andrew T. Wolff, the current rift between Russia and the West is “a result 
of a complex mixture of economic, political and historical factors, but one of its more 
curious antecedents is a disagreement over an alleged promise [not to expand NATO 
eastward] made over 20 years ago. Russia says the origins of the Ukraine crisis lie in 
                                                          
15 By contrast, the figures for those who believe the USSR’s demise caused more harm than good is 25% 
for Kazakhstan and only 8% for Turkmenistan (Esipova, Neli and Julie Ray). 
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NATO’s decision to expand the alliance” (Wolff 2015, 1103). This should lead rational 
political actors to move forward cautiously with NATO expansion. 
Blame and Ambitions 
Of course, the West has a different take on the crisis. It generally accuses Russia 
of being responsible for creating problems in Ukraine—many westerners contend the 
crisis “was sparked by Russian intervention in the internal affairs of Ukraine via the 
illegal annexation of Crimea and the backing of separatist groups in the Donbas 
region”—and they credit NATO for being a stabilizing force in all of Europe—“NATO 
enlargement plays no part in the crisis,” western leaders assert, “because enlargement 
provides stability for all of Europe, and therefore is not threatening to Russia” (Wolff 
2015, 1103). In classical liberal terms, “The West attributes the persistent tensions 
between itself and Russia to the latter’s unwillingness to undertake liberal reforms and to 
cooperate with western powers” (Wolff 2015, 1103). According to realist doctrine, 
however, ‘liberal reforms’ are a façade. Regime type does not matter, as international 
relations are about power and capabilities, so whether Russia is liberal or conservative is 
actually irrelevant.16 As Mearsheimer writes, “the international system creates the same 
basic incentives for all great powers. Whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters 
relatively little for how it acts towards other states” (Mearsheimer 2007, 72). The West in 
concerned about power plays just as much as Russia, and NATO is an instrument it can 
use to flex its diplomatic and military muscles. 
Further evidence that the West is not primarily concerned with democratization, 
the main claim of liberals, is the ample scholarship which proves the link between joining 
                                                          
16 One of the most obvious examples of this (the insignificance of government type) is the United States’ 
relationship with Saudi Arabia. 
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IOs and democracy is not infallible, far from it. Poast and Urpelainen find that “while IO 
membership can promote democratic consolidation through external support for 
institutional development, it cannot directly prevent authoritarian reversals in transitional 
democracies. Moreover, IO membership is particularly important for countries that 
democratize in the shadow of past military rule,” which is evidently the case for Ukraine 
(Poast and Urpelainen 2015, 107). Additionally, the United States has pursued policies 
abroad where they encourage the formation of group rights along ethnic and religious 
lines. This can often be anti-democratic. As Lise Morjé Howard states, the “pursuit of 
‘ethnocratic’ solutions not only runs contrary to American ideals, but it is also not 
pragmatic, in that it enables the creation of regimes that are fragile, divided, and often 
dependent on outside assistance to maintain peace” (Howard 2015, 721). Although 
“Individual political rights and civic national identity lie at the core of American 
democracy…When mediating ethno-religious conﬂicts…US foreign policymakers often 
eschew their own country’s foundational values in favor of rigid, group rights-based 
regimes. Indeed,” these so-called “‘ethnocratic’ regimes enjoy a poor track record in 
terms of forwarding democracy and self-government. They often…prove institutionally 
fragile and prone to ongoing fractionalization and conﬂict” (Howard 2015, 721). In 
Ukraine, the government which the U.S. currently backs is ethnically divisive. The mere 
fact that the crisis in the country reached its tipping point with the introduction of an anti-
Russian language law is revealing, especially when one considers the fact that 14.8 
percent of Ukrainians’ mother tongue is Russian and ethnic Russians make up 17.3 
percent of Ukraine’s population (All-Ukrainian Population Census-2001) According to 
Volodimir Paniotto of the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, “more than 80% of 
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Eastern Ukrainians use Russian” as their language of convenience, and about 30% of the 
population consists of Russophone Ukrainians (Paniotto 2005, 9). Whether the U.S. 
pursues anti-democratic policies by design or whether they stem from a genuine intention 
to democratize and liberalize nations is up for debate, though realists would argue this 
really does not matter. In Morgenthau’s words, “Realism maintains that universal moral 
principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation 
but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” 
(Morgenthau 1993, 11). That is to say that states must prioritize politically successful 
over moral actions, because “There can be no political morality without prudence, that is, 
without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, 
then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political 
actions—to be the supreme value in politics” (Morgenthau 1993, 11). What is clear is that 
evidence is present which demonstrates two crucial elements policymakers either ignore 
or are unaware of. First, pressuring countries to join international organizations, such as 
NATO, does not necessarily lead to long-term democratic reforms, as previously 
demonstrated (Reiter 2001, 58-60).17 Furthermore, since NATO is a military alliance, the 
implications to Russia, should Ukraine or Georgia join the organization, are 
fundamentally different than if it were the World Health Organization or the International 
Air Transportation Association, for instance. Unlike these, NATO does not just facilitate 
cooperation, reduce transaction costs and lengthen the shadow of the future (Keohane and 
Martin 1995, 42; Drezner 2011, 50), its status as a military alliance whose original 
historic purpose was countering the Soviet Union makes it a fundamentally different 
                                                          
17 Albania represents such a case, where despite joining NATO, the country remains only partly free. 
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matter. Second, encouraging ethnocratic regimes, such as the new Ukrainian government, 
is anti-democratic as it supports the marginalization of an important ethnic minority18  
To Join or Not to Join? Ukraine’s Dilemma and Russia’s Fear 
Ukraine has gone back and forth on its commitments to join NATO. In April 
2005, when Yushchenko was in power, “NATO granted Ukraine Intensified Dialogue 
status, which is generally regarded as an important preparatory step toward obtaining a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) and eventual membership” (Larrabee 2007, 48). The 
serious discussions among NATO members to grant Ukraine membership worried 
Russia, but “Yanukovych’s return to power in August 2006 scuttled these plans” 
(Larrabee 2007, 48). His political base mostly comes from the east and south of the 
country, which holds a generally negative view of NATO and favors building ties with 
Russia instead. One particular poll found that “in October 2006, only about 17 percent of 
the Ukrainian population supports NATO membership. According to the same poll, more 
than 50 percent would vote against NATO membership in a referendum,” which is the 
mechanism Yanukovych argued should be used to determine whether or not Ukraine 
should join the alliance (Larrabee 2007, 49). There is also significant reluctance among 
some NATO members themselves to admit Ukraine into the alliance. 
Aside from economic and political concerns, such as the level of democratization 
and a healthy financial system19, some countries have also taken Russia’s ‘feelings,’ so to 
speak, into account—many “worry that Ukrainian membership would antagonize Russia 
and lead to a deterioration of relations with Moscow” (Larrabee 2007, 50). As 
                                                          
18 It should be noted this critique applies equally to Russia, which simply backs a different ethnocratic 
regime. 
19 Ukraine’s “shadow economy roughly equal[s] half the economy. In 2003…the shadow economy [had] 
reached half of Ukraine’s GDP,” and this figure “did not decline in the Yushchenko era” (Kuzio 2011, 94). 
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aforementioned, this is something realists foresaw at the end of the Cold War and it has 
proven to be a valid concern. But while political powers such as Germany and France 
hold this opinion and tread carefully as a result, “The United States has been one of the 
strongest supporters of Ukrainian independence and integration into Western structures, 
particularly NATO” (Larrabee 2007, 59). The prevalent view among Americans is that 
“the door to NATO membership should be kept open. Although,” Larrabee warns, “its 
admission should not be artificially accelerated, membership in NATO could be an 
important means of anchoring Ukraine more closely to the West in the medium term, 
especially because Ukraine’s chances of joining the EU in the next decade are slim,” 
despite EU membership receiving greater popular support in Ukraine (Larrabee 2007, 
60). Others agree, stating plainly, “we should not close the door to NATO for Ukraine or 
to any other potentially qualifying country that meets the alliance’s standards” (Kramer 
2015, 16). Putin and his government have been dedicated to stalling or stopping 
Ukraine’s westward pull. 
Although the current government,20 headed by Petro Poroshenko, may be 
western-focused, the same cannot be said of the population at large. The regions in the 
east, particularly Donetsk and Luhansk, were already angered by the overthrow of 
Yanukovych and, many of them are ethnic Russians or Russian speakers, afraid of the 
changes the new anti-Russian government would bring. Where NATO is concerned, the 
lack of popular support in Ukraine itself makes joining the Organization unlikely, 
however, just as eastern Ukrainians worried, it is possible Russia also saw in the new 
                                                          
20 This government, it should be noted, is comparably undemocratic as Yanukovych’s. 
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government elite the potential for such a move, no matter how unpopular it would have 
been. 
Some scholars, such as David Kramer, believe Putin unintentionally accelerated 
“Ukraine’s westward shift” by annexing Crimea and supporting the rebels in Donbass 
(Kramer 2015, 11). However, his claim that “Ukraine has never been more united” is 
questionable (Kramer 2015, 11). As evidence, he cites the fact that the Rada, Ukraine’s 
Parliament, voted in favor of “revoking Ukraine’s ‘non-bloc’ status and enhancing 
cooperation with NATO, [which] never would have happened had Putin left Ukraine 
alone” (Kramer 2015, 11). The constantly changing political leadership, low approval 
ratings and rampant corruption of Ukraine indicate the contrary. For instance, “On April 
10th, [2016], after weeks of vacillation, the prime minister, Arseniy Yatseniuk, whose 
popularity had plummeted along with Ukrainians’ living standards, offered to resign…his 
[two year] administration was tarred by corruption scandals and stalled reforms. Mr 
Yatseniuk’s offer of resignation was followed by dissension and backroom horse-trading. 
The squabbling exemplified Ukraine’s lack of a responsible political elite” (“Clean-up 
Crew” 2016). The truth, then, is that Ukraine is incredibly divided, especially along 
regional, linguistic and ethnic lines. To state that Putin is solely responsible for 
destabilizing the country fails to take into account how the crisis started and the cultural 
cleavages that exist. Those are at the root of Ukraine’s war. 
Ukraine’s Civil War 
There are several factors that influence the likelihood of civil wars. Despite not 
having been officially labeled as such, the conflict between the Ukrainian government 
and the Donbass region rebels qualifies as one—“Civil wars are violent conflicts that take 
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place primarily within one state, involve the government and at least one organized rebel 
group, and entail some minimum number of people killed” (Cunningham 2016, 309). 
David E. Cunningham cites “Quantitative studies [which] have found that civil war is 
more likely when states have low average incomes, mountainous territory, nondemocratic 
governments, large populations, and have recently experienced a civil war” (Cunningham 
2016, 307). Ukraine falls into most of these categories and follows other patterns that 
make rebellion by minority groups more likely, namely that the latter “are geographically 
concentrated” in the east and south, and have recently been “excluded from political 
power” (Cunningham 2016, 307-08). Ukraine is fundamentally unstable due to the type 
of ethnic inequalities present in the country which makes it prone to civil conflict. 
According to Christian Houle, “Under conditions of high [Between Group Inequality 
(BGI)] and low [Within Group Inequality(WGI)] ethnic and class cleavages reinforce 
each other,” and these “Reinforcing cleavages…accentuate in-group loyalties, enabling 
groups to mount challenges against democratic regimes” (Houle 2015, 470). As a result, 
“when WGI is low, BGI destabilizes democracy by accentuating conflicts over 
distribution/redistribution and by increasing the political salience of ethnicity” (Houle 
2015, 470). In Ukraine, as the inequality between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians 
increases, “the gap between the preferences of different groups for different economic 
policies widens,” with the former favoring pro-EU policies and the latter supporting 
economic deals with Russia (Houle 2015, 470). As is often the case, the initial 
breakdown of (an already fragile) democracy in Ukraine came with a sudden and 
undemocratic regime change which deposed the established government, not with a civil 
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war. But the new regime was more discriminatory, and at least as undemocratic, as the 
one that preceded it. As a result, civil tensions rose to a breaking point in the east. 
Rebels and governments often calculate the chances of receiving international aid 
before launching into a civil war. It is particularly important for the rebels, so “for civil 
war to occur, dissidents have to have some expectation that they will achieve success by 
engaging in it,” something which can be helped by an outside force (Cunningham 2016, 
313). Depending on the circumstances, international aid can lessen the likelihood of war 
breaking out or enable it. In the case of Ukraine, the latter occurred, as both sides 
received international support. The Ukrainian government obtained non-lethal military 
aid and the West’s political and financial support. Meanwhile, the separatists were 
backed by Russia, which provided training, weapons and professional soldiers. Perhaps it 
was the expectation (or knowledge?) that the Kremlin would back them which 
encouraged the separatists to declare themselves an independent republic. In general, 
these kinds of rebellions, start with an attempt to solve differences diplomatically, which 
the Donbass rebels initially tried to do. But in the event that this failed, as was eventually 
the case, the separatists could feel reassured they would have, with Russia’s help, the 
capacity to engage in an armed conflict with a reasonably good chance of success. 
The Russian Threat According to Liberals 
Liberals find reason to worry about the possibility of Russian imperialist 
ambitions and therefore encourage NATO to take on a more involved role in Eastern 
Europe. They focus on the weakness of Russia’s neighbors and on its repeated air and 
naval incursions into foreign territory. Since 2014, there has been a worrisome increase in 
Russian military activity. Putin “has challenged NATO states and others with provocative 
76 
military flights and submarine maneuvers” (Kramer 2015, 14). According to Elizabeth 
Braw, the Russian military [has] paid [many] illegal visit[s] to its ex-Soviet underling[s],” 
including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; even Sweden and Finland have been victims of 
“unwelcome Russian attention” (Braw 2015, 31-32). Belkin, Mix and Woehrel 
corroborate this claim, noting that “in the past year Russian forces have performed air 
and land exercises near Swedish and Finnish territory” (Belkin et al. 2014, 299). In 2014 
alone, Stephen J. Blank adds, 
Moscow repeatedly threatened the Baltic and Nordic states and civilian 
airliners, heightened intelligence penetration, deployed unprecedented 
military forces against those states, intensified overflights and submarine 
reconnaissance, mobilized nuclear forces and threats, deployed nuclear-
capable forces in Kaliningrad, menaced Moldova, and openly violated the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 (Blank 2015, 67). 
 
The fact that Russian leaders indicated that “in 2015 they will concentrate on developing 
military capabilities in the Baltic, Crimea, and the Arctic” adds to the legitimacy of 
western concerns about the Kremlin’s future intentions (Blank 2015, 68). Mearsheimer, 
who himself opposed NATO expansion, notes that “NATO expansion was predicated on 
the belief that Russia might someday try to conquer territory in central Europe” 
(Mearsheimer 2014, 133).21 Liberals therefore feel vindicated in their push for expansion. 
Many liberals favor NATO expansion and there is hope that “Russian military 
aggression could indirectly serve to boost support for NATO membership in Sweden and 
Finland” (Belkin et al. 2014, 299). Sweden is particularly concerning to some, because of 
its weak military. The Swedish government apparently bought into the concept that the 
End of History had come and perpetual peace had descended upon Europe. Their military 
                                                          
21 While some might view the annexation of Crimea as proof this fear has been validated, others, as will be 
examined below, might point to NATO expansion being the culprit in guiding Russia’s actions. 
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capabilities have hence declined strongly and some have gone so far as to state that 
“Sweden would only be able to defend itself for a week without NATO support” (Braw 
2015, 32). In the post-Cold War era, Sweden opted for defense cuts and against NATO 
membership, although it did join the European Union. 
Many in the West have opined that Sweden and Finland ought to reconsider and 
take steps to join the defensive alliance. Russian opposition to such a move is strong, as 
highlighted by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s statement in 2013 “that Moscow 
would be forced to ‘respond’ if Finland or Sweden joined NATO” (Belkin et al. 2014, 
299). In 2014, “Sweden along with Finland finally took the half-step of signing a 
cooperation agreement with NATO” (Braw 2015, 33). Given negative public opinion 
toward NATO membership, however, it is unlikely Sweden or Finland will soon join the 
alliance. 
The Baltic states, on the other hand, are constantly wary of Russia and have built 
up their militaries instead. “As soon as they regained independence,” in 1991, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania “began building territorial defense-based armed forces, the military 
setup that most wealthy Western nations maintain,” and they eagerly and quickly joined 
NATO as well (Braw 2015, 33). As such, they are comparatively better equipped to deal 
with an aggressive Russia. But downsides associated with joining NATO exist, notably, 
that although the Baltic states insist on defense against a possibly imperialist Russia, 
“NATO’s larger member states [demand] a military focused on fighting the Taliban and 
other non-territorial threats, not Russians…Though still worried about Russia, the small-
state trio did as it was told and adapted its militaries to foreign missions, away from home 
defense” (Braw 2015, 33). Russia and NATO even cooperated on missions in 
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Afghanistan, but when the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia came, the Baltic states 
found their suspicions vindicated. To them, the war was “a historical turning point that 
proved them right in their suspicion that the Russian bear would sooner or later begin to 
prowl” (Braw 2015, 34). While the Baltic states saw 2008 as the turning point in their 
relations with Russia, it took the 2014 Ukraine crisis for the rest of the West to embark on 
the same boat. This was partly because, even though “the international setting which led 
to the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia should have…spurred further politico-
military integration” on both sides (Vieira 2014, 566), the energy dependence of Europe 
upon the eastern giant led to continued cooperation. 
NATO member countries, including the United States, have agreed to provide 
Ukraine with non-lethal military aid following the annexation of Crimea and rebellion in 
Donbass. There is a strong NATO presence in the Baltic states, already, although “their 
NATO allies have not agreed to a permanent troop presence” yet (Braw 2015, 36). This is 
a cautionary move, as Russia is likely to view a significant and permanent foreign 
presence near its border as a threat. Unfortunately, the prevailing mood lately has been 
inflammatory, as evidenced by more frequent and large-scale NATO exercises near 
Russia’s borders since 2014, though so far, cooler heads have prevailed, on both sides. 
However, not everyone might agree with that statement. Some have branded the Kremlin 
irrational. Braw ironically notes that biding one’s time and ignoring unreasonable 
aggression only works if “the bully” is rational, but, she comments, “What if he is 
unpredictable and, say, decides to annex a chunk of another country without prior 
warning and in fact without even being officially present in the disputed territory?” 
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(Braw 2015, 37). Her, and other Liberals’, message is clear. However, realists can and do 
convincingly portray the Kremlin as rational.22 
Changing the Game? 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization states that an attack against 
one of its members is an attack against all, and therefore, all member states are tasked 
with protecting each other in the event of war. Realists, as expressed below, view this as 
a safeguard against Russian aggression, as a matter, not of intentions or desires, but of 
military capability. Russia has been beefing up those capabilities. Some worry that 
“within five years Russia could run multiple Ukraine-sized operations in Europe. In 
rethinking the character of contemporary war, Moscow has arguably moved beyond its 
adaptation of the US concept of network-centric war, which drove previous defense 
reforms starting in 2008” (Blank 2015, 69). By 2025, it is believed possible that Russia’s 
forces “would have parity with the US and NATO in conventional and nuclear 
dimensions of high-tech warfare, and therefore the capability to deter and intimidate 
NATO” (Blank 2015, 69-70). This seems dubious. Even though Russia is and will keep 
building up its military forces, so will Poland, the Baltic states, and most significantly, 
the United States, NATO’s leading country. Article 5 means Russia would probably not 
attack a member of the organization, regardless of its improved capabilities. 
Regardless of these actual military capabilities, whether they be strong enough in 
a few years to confront NATO or not, liberals have begun to worry that Ukraine might be 
changing the game in a way that makes the application of Article 5 murky. The Ukraine 
crisis has created a concept which can be aptly called ‘ambiguous warfare.’ As Braw 
                                                          
22 See below, “The Realist View—Don’t Poke The Bear” 
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highlights, “events in eastern Ukraine, where separatists are suspected of operating in 
conjunction with Russia, an allegation denied by Moscow…are changing the military 
game,” and the question becomes, “how do you prove that [Ukrainian rebels] are 
connected to Russia? That is the weakness of the NATO treaty” (Braw 2015, 36). This is 
cause, certain policy-makers and scholars contend, for an expanded and more permanent 
NATO influence and presence in Eastern Europe. This seems illogical. While troops 
permanently based in Eastern Europe serve as a deterrent against conventional warfare, 
they will not stop cyber-attacks, propaganda campaigns, the funding of subversive groups 
and similar non-conventional means of waging war which are the most prevalent methods 
in this case. 
The Realist View—Don’t Poke the Bear 
Realists have a much different opinion regarding the Ukraine crisis, the role 
NATO has and should play, and what the West’s response should be. Realist thought 
offers a more prudent approach, one that still values military preparedness but advises 
against rash and alienating actions. While it is important for NATO, the EU, and the U.S. 
to offer Russia a united front which opposes the latter’s aggressiveness, there are some 
issues with the West’s reactions. 
First and foremost, there is a lack of cultural understanding and an inability or 
unwillingness to understand Russia’s reasoning. There is a mainstream alarmist trend that 
contends Russia’s actions in Crimea were the beginning of a renewed imperialist dream, 
and potentially the first step in pan-European conflict with Russia as the conquering 
aggressor. For any scholar who understands Russia’s motivations, this is a questionable 
claim. As a rational actor, the Kremlin is aware it would not be able to win a war against 
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NATO, and since an invasion of one member country represents an invasion of all NATO 
members, it is extremely unlikely Russia would attack such a nation. Furthermore, if 
Russia had intended to invade all of Ukraine, as some believed—“Some observers 
believe Russia could use widespread violence in eastern Ukraine as a pretext for military 
intervention” (Belkin et al. 2014, 294)—it would have already done so. According to 
“Respected Russian military observer Pavel Felgenhauer…Putin’s military window of 
opportunity for an invasion of eastern and southern Ukraine [was] from [April 2014] to 
about mid-May” (Belkin et al. 2014, 294). Military experts agree Russia does not have 
the capacity to occupy the entire nation state of Ukraine. Other time frames of 
opportunity have come and gone without a wide-scale Russian invasion which would 
extend beyond Crimea. For instance, the Kremlin failed to seize an opportunity to create 
chaos “in eastern and southern Ukraine” when it failed to “disrupt Ukraine’s May 25 
presidential election” which could have provided “the pretext for an invasion” (Belkin et 
al. 2014, 294). Although, as realists often stress, it is impossible to be certain of 
countries’ intentions, especially when they are hostile, it appears as though Russia did not 
and does not wish to invade or occupy all of Ukraine. Realists, however, would focus 
more heavily on the fact that Russia does not possess the military capability and capacity 
to successfully occupy Ukraine beyond Crimea’s borders or to invade any NATO 
member country. 
Cooperation and Lack Thereof 
The United States has been actively cooperating with its NATO partners in the 
east following the 2014 crisis. Even prior to this, though, the United States had been 
working closely, particularly with Poland, to improve defense in that region. The U.S. 
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government, despite its reduction of troops stationed in Europe and its “pivot” toward 
Asia, “remains prepared and able to honor its commitments to the defense and security of 
fellow NATO member states” (Belkin et al. 2014, 300). Despite non-lethal military aid 
which the U.S. has provided to Ukraine (for instance, 300,000 Meals Ready to Eat) and 
significant American contributions to eastern European defense, some believe those still 
fall short. Critics have argued “that more should be done to support Ukraine, reassure 
allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and counter Russian aggression. Some have called 
for bolstered and possibly permanent NATO and/or U.S. troop deployments in Central 
and Eastern Europe, as well as more frequent military exercises, including in the Black 
Sea” (Belkin et al. 2014, 300). Senator John McCain has been a strong proponent of such 
actions. According to him, Ukrainians “love the United States of America, they love 
freedom–and I don't think you could view this as anything other than our traditional 
support for people who want free and democratic society…the destiny [they] seek lies in 
Europe” (“John McCain tells Ukraine Protesters…” 2013). McCain has even argued in 
favor of sending lethal military aid to Ukraine, criticizing President Obama for refusing 
to do so, “Since the crisis in Ukraine began nearly a year ago, President Obama has 
stubbornly refused to provide lethal military assistance that would help Ukraine defend 
its sovereign territory and determine its own political future free of Russian coercion. By 
doing so, the President has isolated himself from the growing consensus…that this 
beleaguered democracy needs and deserves increased American support” (McCain 2015). 
While intra-NATO cooperation has benefited from the crisis, relations with 
Russia have taken a serious hit. As a consequence of the Ukraine crisis, “NATO 
suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia on April 2 [2014]” 
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(Belkin et al. 2014, 295). Defense along NATO members’ Russian borders has been 
shored up. Diplomatically, Russia was “kicked out of the Group of 8, and Putin left the 
November Group of 20 meeting in Brisbane, Australia, early after receiving a brow-
beating from other leaders” (Kramer 2015, 14). 
The Future of NATO Enlargement 
Among liberals, the answer to Russian aggression tends to be a resounding: 
“Expand NATO!” They view the organization as a force for peace and stability, which is 
not unusual, given their long-standing belief that IGOs help enhance cooperation and the 
spread of democracy in the world (as noted in chapter I). Following the actions of Russia 
in Ukraine, “some U.S. observers and Members of Congress [called] for a more 
concerted NATO effort to enlarge the alliance, particularly to the east” (Belkin et al. 
2014, 297). But what if NATO is a cause of, rather than a solution to, the Russian 
problem? This is a point some realist scholars have argued, quite convincingly at times. 
Even before the Ukraine crisis arose, NATO’s eastward expansion was a point of 
contention. Scholars have continually asserted that “Ukraine’s potential NATO 
membership is arguably the most important and complex enlargement decision facing the 
Alliance, just as the emergence of an independent Ukraine was the most significant 
geopolitical consequence of the Soviet Union’s disintegration” (Barany 2006, 174). 
Expansion would be a grave mistake, as the prospect of eastward NATO enlargement is 
one of the main causes for the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and one of Russia’s 
predominant concerns with Ukraine. Indeed, “Some observers assert that the Ukrainian 
government could be cautious about expressing ambitions to join NATO for a number of 
reasons, including sensitivity to public opinion and possible opposition to membership 
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from countries within the alliance that would be reluctant to further antagonize Russia” 
(Belkin et al. 2014, 298). Putin has often cited the West’s promise “that after Germany’s 
unification, NATO wouldn’t spread eastward. The then NATO Secretary-General told us 
that the alliance wouldn’t expand beyond its eastern borders” and the Russian president 
“went on to admit that the fear of Ukrainian entry into NATO had partly motivated his 
decision to annex Crimea;” it is important to grasp the fact that “The Russian government 
views the situation in Ukraine through a lens of repeated western betrayal, creeping 
NATO encroachment and disrespect for its security concerns” (Wolff 2015, 1103).23 As a 
matter of fact, one factor which heightened Russian fears in April 2014 was “NATO 
Secretary General Rasmussen’s assertion that the door to NATO membership for Ukraine 
remained open,” however, some NATO members disagreed with that statement and 
quickly expressed this; for instance, “German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
reportedly countered that ‘NATO membership for Ukraine is not pending’” (Belkin et al. 
2014, 298). Since “the policy of enlargement caused a significant and longstanding 
breach in relations between the West and Russia [and in] order to reduce these tensions, 
NATO leaders must admit they have failed in their attempts to turn Russia into a reliable, 
western-oriented partner, realize that their open-door enlargement policy has created 
insecurity in Europe, and alter this policy by injecting it with geopolitical reasoning” 
rather than a constant focus on liberalizing others (Wolff 2015, 1103-04). 
A geopolitically-motivated NATO would mean altering some of the alliance’s 
current trajectories. Rather than “evaluating countries for membership on the basis…of 
normative criteria,” which Ukraine does not currently meet regardless, NATO would take 
                                                          
23 It should also be noted that Russia itself has not always lived up to its post-Cold War commitments. In 
particular as it regards Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. 
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into account “how their inclusion increases overall alliance security, especially in 
relationship to Russia” (Wolff 2015, 1104). This would mark a dramatic departure from 
the current mentality, but it is not the only change necessary. The geopolitical NATO 
would encourage the creation of buffer zones which would reduce “tensions between the 
West and Russia through the creation of separating space. A geopolitically driven 
enlargement policy would seek to establish Ukraine as a neutral buffer zone” (Wolff 
2015, 1104). The Organization would therefore “pursue enlargement in the Balkans and 
Scandinavia, but would deny admission to Georgia and Ukraine,” a theoretical about-face 
from current rhetoric which aims to have these two countries join as soon as they meet 
required criteria (Wolff 2015, 1104). This would mean greater stability in Europe and 
lead to improved East-West relations. 
In Ukraine too, there is strong opposition to joining the Organization, which 
makes Ukrainian membership unlikely. Despite an earlier push by the Kuchma and 
Yushchenko administrations to move closer to the West, under President Viktor 
Yanukovych, Ukraine renounced previous aspirations to join NATO. This, evidently, 
suited Russia, which perhaps feared that the new and more radical government which 
forced its way to power in 2014 would seek membership once more. It is unlikely this 
will happen, though, for the same reasons it was abandoned previously. As 
aforementioned, the majority of Ukrainians do not favor NATO membership and it is an 
issue that is highly divisive and split along regional lines. A March 2014 opinion poll 
found that “34% of Ukrainians were for NATO membership, and 44% opposed, with a 
regional split of 74% for membership in western Ukraine and 67% opposed in the east” 
(Belkin et al. 2014, 289). 
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Conclusion 
Relations between the West, Russia and Ukraine have never been easy, and they 
certainly have hit a few important roadblocks these past few years. Ukraine has struggled 
to establish successful democratic government and has been fairly consistently unstable 
throughout the past two decades, whether under more pro-Western or more pro-Russian 
leadership. As easy as it is for governments in the West to point to Russia’s destabilizing 
influence and illegal actions toward its little brother, it is important to recognize that 
mistakes have been made on all sides, not just the easternmost one. 
The most notable error the West has made is the continued eastern expansion of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia sees this defensive military alliance as an 
enemy force and a real and serious threat. As the Cold War was drawing to a close, 
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was given top-level assurances NATO would not 
expand further east. This promise was broken, leaving the Russian Federation bitter and 
betrayed. The paternalistic ‘Motherland’ has always viewed Georgia and Ukraine as part 
of its own sphere of influence and, ergo, as ‘off-limits’ to western powers. Since all great 
powers seek to achieve regional hegemony, it is logical and by no means atypical that 
Russia seeks to maintain its superiority and influence in the region, impeding the West’s 
attempts to encroach upon this territory. By annexing Crimea, Russia behaved as a 
rational actor, seeking to protect its geostrategic assets and drawing on deep cultural ties 
to obtain what it wished without much bloodshed. Russia’s support of the separatists in 
Ukraine can also be viewed as rational, since the new government they were rebelling 
against was, at the minimum, pro-West, and could be feasibly considered anti-Russia. 
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In this particular case, realist views are more applicable and the West ought to 
follow a realist-based policy, rather than a liberal one. Liberalism can be commended on 
its pursuit of human rights and democratization, but in the Ukraine crisis, the paths which 
its proponents recommend incite warmongering. Perhaps in the future it will be possible 
for Russia and NATO to view each other as peaceful neighbors, but for now, the best 
option is to halt eastward expansion.  
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Conclusion 
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, intergovernmental organizations have widely 
proliferated. The League of Nations, though not the first IGO, served as the template for 
modern-day IGOs. Its failures highlighted the importance of strong state commitment, 
economic interdependence, cultural ethnocentrism and perceived legitimacy. Successful 
subsequent organizations have learned from the League’s shortcomings, and today, they 
occupy an important place in international relations. IGOs have come to cover a wide 
range of subject matters, from aviation, to economics, health and defense. Some have 
greater legitimacy and are much more effective than others. Although they do not all 
serve the same purpose, fundamentally, IGOs strive to help governments improve 
cooperation on common issues which affect them. Although they have their limitations, 
IGOs will continue to play a significant role in international relations for the foreseeable 
future. Efforts should therefore be directed at how to best reform and improve IGOs in 
order to maximize their utility, efficiency and beneficial impact. 
One of the most important defense alliances of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was formed in 1949 in order to 
defend Western Europe from the Soviet Union. When the Cold War ended, there was 
much heated debate about what ought to happen to the organization, given it had outlived 
its initial mandate. Liberals champion the proliferation of IGOs, believing them to be 
effective means of cooperation, and hence a force for peace and stability. As such, liberal 
voices strongly favored the continued existence and the eastward expansion of NATO in 
the post-Soviet world. Realists, on the other hand, foresaw many potential problems 
arising from this expansionist path. Realist thought offers a more prudent approach to 
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international politics. Since the world is anarchic, states are self-interested actors who 
value power above all else, as that affords security. Although a more pessimistic view 
than liberalism, realism prescribes a more prudent approach to international relations. 
While they view the world as constantly subject to discord, they tend to advocate for 
policies which make war less likely. In the case of NATO, realists favored either the 
dissolution of the alliance, or at least, they counseled against the organization’s 
expansion. Correctly, they assumed pushing NATO’s borders eastward would create 
instability and lead to heightened tensions between the west and Russia, which would 
fear western encroachments into its backyard, thereby upsetting the fragile balance of 
power. Liberal predictions argued NATO would be a force for democracy, peace and 
stability, however it could be argued the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and 2014 Ukraine 
crisis may have demonstrated the contrary. Fears that the organization, which Russia 
views as a hostile military force, would encroach upon Russia’s sphere of influence led to 
retaliatory rhetoric and action. 
Unfortunately, it is too late now, in 2016, to turn back the clock and prevent the 
expansion of NATO. It is not too late, however, to stop or restrain eastward expansionism 
and halt the growth of the defense alliance. It has also become unlikely at best that early 
liberal hopes that Russia would one day be incorporated into the organization will be 
realized. Instead, it appears as though other means of west-Russia cooperation ought to 
be pursued, perhaps with the eventual goal of a NATO-like defense alliance which 
includes both the U.S. and Russia. For now, however, the best course of action available 
to peace and stability appears to be a scaling back of NATO and the cessation of its 
expansion, particularly eastward into Russia’s ‘backyard’. 
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IGOs do not necessarily bring peace and stability. Liberals support these 
organizations’ proliferation in the world based on the premise and widely-held belief that 
they can help democratize nations and create more cooperative, and hence peaceful, 
relations between states, leading to greater stability in an anarchic system that is naturally 
volatile. Realists dispute these claims on all counts. The case of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s expansion seems to indicate that, at least where this particular IGO is 
concerned, liberals are incorrect. In fact, where the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and 2014 
Ukraine crisis are concerned, NATO seems to have partial responsibility for stoking 
tensions and inciting conflict. Given that NATO is a military alliance and therefore 
somewhat of a special case, being the only IGO of its kind, this does not mean that all 
IGOs are prone to such conflict-inducing behavior, however, it should lead scholars and 
policymakers to move forward cautiously with IGO expansion. 
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